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with Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan and Luc Laeven) 52
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
v
2.3 Data and Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.3.1 Firm-Level Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.3.2 Matching Firm- and Bank-Level Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.3.3 Matching Bank-Level Data to Banks’ Sovereigns . . . . . . . . 71
2.3.4 Data Cleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.3.5 Construction of Variables and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . 72
2.4 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.5 Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.5.1 Role of Weak Sovereigns and Weak Banks . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.5.2 Threats to Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A Appendix for Chapter 1 94
A.1 Competitive equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.1.1 Unconstrained solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.1.2 Unconstrained solution under sovereign default . . . . . . . . 95
A.1.3 Constrained solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
B Appendix for Chapter 2 97
B.1 AMADEUS Data Cleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
B.1.1 Cleaning of Basic Reporting Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
B.2 Internal Consistency of Balance Sheet Information . . . . . . . . . . . 98
B.3 Further Quality Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
vi
List of Tables
1.1 Results of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) controlling for expropriation
risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Parametrization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.3 Results for mercantilist economy without political-economy frictions . 43
1.4 Results for mercantilist economy with political-economy frictions . . . 46
1.5 Results for non-mercantilist economy with political-economy frictions 50
2.1 Euro Area Firm Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.2 Multiple and Cross-Border Firm-Bank Relationships . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.3 Euro Area Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.4 Benchmark Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.5 Role of Aggregate Demand Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.6 Periphery and Crisis Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.7 Role of Weak Banks (Periphery Sovereign Holdings) . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.8 Role of Weak Banks (Periphery Domestic Sovereign Holdings) . . . . 90
vii
List of Figures
1.1 Correlation between Net Public Foreign Assets and Expropriation Risk 12
1.2 Correlation between Foreign Reserves and PPG Debt, and Expropri-
ation Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4 Effects of political-economy frictions in key variables: mercantilism . 45
1.5 Effects of political-economy frictions in key variables: no mercantilism 49
2.1 Evolution of gross investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2 Evolution of net investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3 Evolution of corporate debt to gross domestic product . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4 Evolution of Total Debt to Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5 Debt by maturity and firm size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.6 Average Net Investment Rate by Level of Indebtedness . . . . . . . . 92
viii
Chapter 1: Institutional Quality and Sovereign International Flows
1.1 Introduction
Global imbalances are an important feature of the international economy:
high-growth emerging-market economies export capital to advanced economies.1
These capital inflows are rooted in sovereign-to-sovereign flows, mostly interna-
tional reserve accumulation and foreign public debt consolidation (Alfaro, Kalemli-
Özcan, and Volosovych, 2014; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013; Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jørgensen, 2007). The literature has dealt with three main reasons for this
phenomenon: precautionary savings (Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones, 2009; Jeanne
and Rancière, 2011), mercantilism (Benigno and Fornaro, 2012; Korinek and Servén,
2010), and expropriation risk (Aguiar and Amador, 2011). However, none of these
three explanations alone can explain the extent and diversity of this phenomenon,
and focusing in one mechanism at the time does not allow the assessment of their
relative importance.2
In this respect, this paper shows the great importance of mercantilism and
sudden stops in emerging market economies in explaining the existence of net posi-
1For a specific definition and discussion on global imbalances, see Gourinchas and Rey (2014).
2More recently, Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Mart́ınez (2012) have proposed a fourth motive,
rollover risk, which will not be dealt with in the present work.
1
tive international public assets, while political economy frictions can account for the
varying degrees that asset accumulation is achieved across economies with similar
characteristics. An increase of 50 percent in these frictions implies a reduction of
almost 20 percentage points of GDP in net foreign public assets, in the context
of economies with growth externalities, so there is a motive for mercantilism. On
the other hand, if mercantilism is not taken into account, sovereigns accumulate
net foreign liabilities, which dampens their access to international markets. In a
model without mercantilism, political-economy frictions have less power to explain
differences in net foreign positions (5 percentage points of GDP), but can explain
differences in sovereign risk: a reduction of 70 percent in political-economy frictions
can reduce the sovereign spread by 800 basis points.
As far as I know, this is the first paper providing a plausible framework for
a small open economy where the government builds a positive net foreign asset
position, while stressing the important differences that political-economy frictions
and mercantilist strategies can generate among the net foreign-asset positions of
governments in emerging-market and developing economies.3
The present work builds a two-sector small-open-economy model featuring
political-economy frictions, sovereign default, exogenous sudden stops affecting firms’
working capital, and learning-by-trade externalities. Political-economy frictions con-
3Most papers yield a positive stock of foreign reserves (Benigno and Fornaro, 2012; Jeanne and
Rancière, 2011) but without considering the stock of public debt; Benigno and Fornaro (2012)
manages to explain jointly a positive net foreign asset position of the overall economy, but is
silent about foreign public debt. Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Mart́ınez (2012) manages to achieve a
joint explanation of the existence of public debt and reserve assets, although the net balance is
still negative. Aguiar and Amador (2011) explains why economies reduce their foreign liabilities
in order to reduce expropriation risk and promote growth, but the net foreign position of the
government is still negative.
2
sist of time-inconsistent preferences originating in the differences in consumption
valuation of incumbent versus opposition parties, which increases the risk that the
government expropriates foreign assets in the country. For this paper, instead of
modeling the nationalization of foreign capital, a sovereign default is introduced, as
default has been far more common during this era of globalization than nationaliza-
tion, as shown by Tomz and Wright (2010). Sovereign default risk can be interpreted
as expropriation risk, since the risk is that the government appropriates future debt
payments belonging to their creditors.
In this setting, firms in the tradable sector face occasional exogenous sudden
stops, which affect their working capital. In practical terms, they face financing
shortages when purchasing imported goods to be used in their production processes.
When this happens, the government may step in and provide credit, but in an
inefficient and limited way, since it is usually subject to sudden stops as much
as their firms (Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Mart́ınez, 2012). This provides a strong
precautionary savings motive.
The presence of externalities in the tradable sector is due to the fact that
the aggregate stock of knowledge utilized to produce a modern tradable good has
a positive covariance with the amount of imported inputs utilized. However no
firm can exploit this covariance privately. The government cannot provide direct
subsidies to the tradable sector to exploit these externalities, since such subsidies
are forbidden by international trade law. The only instrument she has to exploit
this externality is the accumulation of net foreign assets. This motive of net foreign
asset accumulation by the government is called “mercantilism” and is still subject to
3
debate in policy and academic research, both on the empirical and theoretical front.
The next section features a literature review, which is followed by a discussion
of the empirical facts, the quantitative model and its properties, and the final results
and conclusions.
1.2 Literature
The closest strand of literature to this chapter is that on small open economies
with political-economy frictions. The political-institutional setting in this paper
comes directly from Aguiar and Amador (2011). The authors propose a theory
of political-economy frictions causing governments to vary their net foreign assets
to reduce the expropriation risk. This expropriation consists of nationalizing the
capital brought in by foreign investors, enduring autarky forever as a punishment.
Hence, economies with better institutions (less political-economy frictions) secure
foreign investors’ property rights by increasing public foreign savings. This also
promotes faster convergence to the steady state. However, my paper is different in
that it models models sovereign default, as it considers the fact that expropriation
of foreign creditors to the sovereign are far more frequent than nationalizations of
foreign physical capital; it also considers the presence of sudden stops that arrive
from abroad and reduces access to finance by the overall economy, and adds a growth
trend which is affected by the externalities present in the tradable sectors.
Other papers focus on the government’s gross positions. As for gross debt,
Amador (2003, 2012) and Aguiar and Amador (2014) assume that politicians de-
4
mand debt ex-post due to their inability to save stemming from political-economy
frictions similar to those in Aguiar and Amador (2011), so the desire to borrow again
in the future enforces repayment today. D’Erasmo (2008), using a different politi-
cal structure, shows that a benevolent government transiting between two states of
patience replicates the observed default frequency and the ratio of gross sovereign
debt to gross national product at the moment of default.
For foreign gross sovereign assets (for which reserve accumulation is the main
component), literature linking reserves and institutions is rather scant. Aizenman
and Marion (2004) show both empirically and theoretically that corruption and
short-term incentives reduce the demand for foreign reserves, which is qualitatively
consistent with papers addressing gross foreign sovereign debt.
Our paper leaves as a future extension to consider gross positions of the gov-
ernment, both for ease of modeling and exposition, an the impact on gross and
net asset positions with respect to measures of institutional quality are the same
empirically, as expected.
Another literature worth mentioning is that studying institutional quality and
fiscal counter-cyclicity. Governments from countries with strong, savvy institutions
tend to lower fiscal spending during booms and increase it during busts, as shown in
Frankel, Végh, and Vuletin (2013). Fiscal countercyclicity depends on the level and
changes in the measures of institutional quality. Also, there is a literature linking
institutional quality and private capital flows: Gourio, Simer, and Verdelhan (2015)
shows that the VIX forecasts political risk, and that when it increases, capital inflows
decrease and outflows increase. The expropriation risk in their model is a stochastic
5
tax on capital inflows, i.e. a nationalization of foreign capital. Despite the fact
that expropriation risk is not endogenous, their work highlights the mechanisms by
which institutional quality influences private capital inflows, as found previously by
Alfaro, Kalemli-Özcan, and Volosovych (2008) and Papaioannou (2009).
Also, there is a vast literature on foreign reserve accumulation that addresses
the basic economic motives for governments to accumulate assets. Precautionary
savings is one important motive. International reserves provide a defense against
sudden stops under increasing financial globalization (Durdu, Mendoza, and Ter-
rones, 2009). Other aspects are explored in Aizenman and Lee (2007), Choi, Sharma,
and Strömqvist (2007), Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009), and Caballero and Panageas
(2008). Despite its importance, the precautionary motive in isolation fails to ac-
count for a positive net foreign asset position, which has been very common during
the last decades, as governments increased their net reserve hoarding and decreased
their international sovereign debt positions. Explaining a positive net foreign asset
position is an important achievement of my paper.
Another important motive for reserve accumulation is mercantilism.4Some
economies do not let their currencies appreciate in order to promote economic growth
through exports (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2004; Eichengreen, 2004).
Accumulating reserves, hence, is a result of preventing real appreciation, and this is
how reserve accumulation can be related to output growth (Rodrik, 2008).5 Models
4Mercantilism refers to the prevalent economic doctrine in Europe during the XVII-XIX cen-
turies, where countries accumulated monetary reserves (mainly gold) by running trade balance
surpluses of finished goods. For a reference, see Ekelund and Hébert (2013).
5This view, however, has been challenged by Reinhart, Reinhart, and Tashiro (2016), as reserve
accumulation seems to crowd out private investment in East-Asian economies, excluding China
and India (which coincidentally feature strict capital controls.) Woodford (2009) argues, on the
6
of mercantilist reserve accumulation rely on endogenous growth with externalities
present in the tradable sector. To exploit these externalities, the central planner
hoards reserves as a second best mechanism to direct subsidies (Korinek and Servén,
2010). As a by-product, these reserves also provide foreign working-capital floww
during sudden stops (Benigno and Fornaro, 2012).6
These models describe the mechanisms by which mercantilism works, but ex-
plaining why successful cases of mercantilism are so few requires looking at political
and institutional factors. There are well-studied cases of failed export-led growth
strategies, such as Latin America between 1870 and 1930 (Catão, 1992; Cortés-
Conde, 1992; Gómez-Galvarriato and Williamson, 2009), where political issues were
connected with the failure of these policies.7,8 In this paper, I show that political-
economy frictions can account for differences in the amount of foreign savings across
government. Also, political economy frictions can explain significant differences in
the output per capita in the long run.
Other motives for hoarding reserves which I do not address are their role in
enhancing domestic policies by allowing exchange-rate manipulation (Alfaro and
Kanczuk, 2013), and the prevention of rollover risk in long-term sovereign foreign
other hand, that undervaluation is just a consequence of excess savings and strict capital controls,
instead of means to promote growth by exporting.
6An important matter is why reserves are held despite yielding lower returns compared to other
instruments. One reason is its imperfect substitutability with private foreign debt (Benigno and
Fornaro, 2012). Intermittent access to international capital markets leaves reserves as the sole
backstop to tradable-goods producing firms. Under perfect substitutability, it is optimal to reduce
debt holdings and hold no foreign reserves (Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2009).
7After the Great Depression, most countries in Latin America embarked in Import-Substitution
strategies, following the “Prebisch Doctrine” (Prebisch and Mart́ınez-Cabañas, 1949). For a con-
trast with Emerging Asia, see Baer (1984).
8For a description of the prevailing international monetary system prevailing during 1870-1930
see Eichengreen (1992) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
7
debt (Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Mart́ınez, 2012). The former requires a monetary
model, which is beyond the scope of this paper, while the latter requires modeling
gross positions, which is left to future extensions.
In a broader sense, the current paper relates to the global imbalances literature,
which has been prolific and well-cited. The first theories emphasized the presence
of a global savings glut (Bernanke, 2005) –although with no regard to which sectors
actually engaged in saving– while connecting this to the conundrum of low long-
term interest rates in the United States (Greenspan, 2005). On the other hand,
Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) and Eichengreen (2004) explain global
imbalances instead using mercantilism, by comparing the current global imbalances
(1996 to present) to those of the Bretton Woods era (1946-1973). Countries pursuing
export-led growth strategies –such as Germany and Japan at that time– resisted
depreciation of their currencies, just as Emerging Asia is thought as doing recently.9
Another view is financial sector development, which is low in economies less
able to diversify away idiosyncratic risk (Angeletos and Panousi, 2011; Buera and
Shin, 2009; Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ŕıos-Rull, 2009), which explains why firms in
less financially developed countries export capital to firms in more financially devel-
oped economies. Although some supporting evidence exists for advanced economies
(Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ŕıos-Rull, 2009), for the rest of the world Alfaro, Kalemli-
Özcan, and Volosovych (2014) and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) show that these
savings were channeled abroad by the public sector rather than the private sec-
9For a general review on possible causes of global imbalances, refer to Eichengreen and Park
(2006) and Eichengreen (2006).
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tor. Moreover, Chinn, Eichengreen, and Ito (2014) shows that government budget
deficits in advanced economies and public savings in emerging-market economies
are related under global imbalances. This is reserve accumulation in form of safe
instruments such as Treasuries, Gilts, BTFs and Bunds. As shown in my paper,
emerging-market countries with better institutional will demand more foreign re-
serve assets. This demand increase the extent to which global safe assets are scarce
(Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008), and hence strengthen global imbalances.
Although less directly, this paper relates to work on the economic effect of in-
stitutionssuch as Acemoğlu, Robinson, and Johnson (2001), Acemoğlu et al. (2014),
Alesina and Dollar (2000), Jones and Olken (2005), Jones and Olken (2009), Lindqvist
and Östling (2010) and Azzimonti and Talbert (2014), among other works.
The following section will show stylized facts on the relation between institu-
tional quality and foreign public assets in the data.
1.3 Stylized Facts
This section shows the relationship between institutional quality and public
net and gross foreign assets. Data come primarily from the World Development
Indicators Database Archive. Net foreign savings is measured as the difference be-
tween stock of international reserves (excluding gold) and the stock of Public and
Publicly Guaranteed Debt. To extend data availability, I use vintages of the World
Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF) issues dat-
ing back to 1989, as some countries are dropped from the dataset as soon as they
9
become high-income economies, according to the World Bank classification.
Data on national accounts, purchasing-power-parity (PPP) measures and for-
eign exchange rates come from the Penn World Tables (PWT) version 8.1 (Feenstra,
Inklaar, and Timmer, 2015). This new version makes available data on national ac-
counts at current and constant local-currency prices in addition to the PPP-adjusted
series.
Another important set of indicators for this topic are the capital account open-
ness measures from Chinn and Ito (2008), and the Political Risk Index and its
subcomponents, from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), available monthly
since 1984.10 I will particularly use the investment profile subcomponent as a mea-
sure of expropriation risk. The investment profile category is an assessment of factors
affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic and
financial risk components in the total ICRG index of Political Risk, and it is com-
posed of three subcategories: contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation,
and payment delays. The first measures the risk of unilateral contract modification
or cancellation and, at worst, outright expropriation of foreign owned assets; the
second measures to what extent can profits be transferred out of the host coun-
try (impediments include exchange controls, excessive bureaucracy, a poor banking
system, etc.); and the latter is the risk associated with receiving and exporting pay-
ments from the country (impediments include poor liquidity, exchange controls, an
inadequate banking system, etc.). Although the first subcomponent is the most di-
10Another set of indices widely used in the literature are those related to political structure
and are much longer dated, for example, Polity IV, Freedom House, Keefer and Stasavage (2003),
and Beck et al. (2001). However, they do not measure expropriation risk as directly as some
subcomponents of ICRG.
10
rect measure of expropriation risk, it is available only starting 2001. For this reason
I use the broader investment profile time series, dating back to 1984.
Ideally, we would like to make series as comparable as possible, both inter-
nationally and intertemporally. Following Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), I use an
implicit trade deflator QTct for country c and year t,
11 from PWT 8.1, as a combina-








whereX andM corresponds to the average-of-period shares in current PPP-adjusted
exports and imports, respectively. In previous versions, this trade deflator is not
available, so the investment deflator is used to compare across countries; however,








where CGDP (RGDP ) is the GDP in current (chained) PPP-adjusted 2005 dollars.
The adjusted stocks of foreign assets and liabilities, which I denote as real stocks,
are scaled by GDP in chained PPP 2005 dollars. The results are reserves and PPG
debt adjusted across period and country, and scaled by real GDP.
11They use version 7.1 of PWT, which does not report deflators for exports and imports, so the
authors deflate series using the price of investment; however, they recommend the use of trade
deflators for capital flows whenever possible.
12These deflators are normalized such that the price level of GDP in the United States in 2005
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Expropriation Risk [0-12]
Figure 1.1: Correlation between Net Public Foreign Assets and Expro-
priation Risk. Plot shows average real reserves stock as share of real
GDP against the average level of the investment profile subcomponent
of the ICRG political risk index, which measures Expropriation Risk.
In the figure, a high value in the Expropriation Risk measure implies a
low expropriation risk. Averages are taken over available data between
1980 and 2011. Source: Own elaboration on WDI Database Archive and
ICRG.
In Figure 1.1 I depict the relation between net sovereign foreign assets and
expropriation risk (as measured by investment profile component of the ICRG Po-
litical Risk Index.) The relation is significant and positive. When decomposing the
net foreign public assets into foreign reserves and PPG debt, as shown in Figure 1.2,
it is clear PPG debt is negatively correlated with the index of expropriation risk,
while foreign reserves are positively correlated. All of these relations are maintained





















































































































































































































3 5 7 9 11
Expropriation Risk [0-12]
(b) Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt
Figure 1.2: Correlation between Foreign Reserves and PPG Debt, and
Expropriation Risk. In the top panel, the plot shows average real reserves
stock as share of real GDP against the average level of expropriation
risk, as measured by the investment profile variable in ICRG. In the
bottom panel, the plot shows average real PPG debt as share of real
GDP against the average level of expropriation risk. Averages are taken
over available data between 1980 and 2011. Source: Own elaboration on
WDI Database Archive and ICRG.
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It is important, however, to control for other determinants of the public in-
ternational investment position. I will follow the empirical strategy of Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2013). This strategy follows from a neoclassical model that, although
differing from the model I build in this chapter, features also a small open economy.
Their right hand side variables consist of international capital flows, both pri-
vate and public. These are accumulated flows between 1980 and 2000, scaled by
GDP. I will focus on the public flows, which are composed of Public and Publicly
Guaranteed (PPG) Debt and International Reserves, as explained in previous para-
graphs. On the left hand side I will control for productivity catch-up with the United
States, the ratio of initial capital to GDP and the ratio of foreign public debt to
GDP, the growth of the 15-64 year-old population, capital openness (as measured
by Chinn and Ito (2008)) and the expropriation risk measure from ICRG.13
The results are shown in Table 1.1. The results from columns 1 to 4, reproduce
the original results. The coefficients must be interpreted with the opposite sign, this
is, an increase in productivity catch-up will increase the outflows of the public flows
(recall that in the Balance of Payment Manual 5 an outflow is indicated with a
negative sign), as does an increase in capital account openness.
Columns 5 to 8 add the expropriation risk measure as independent regressor,
where results suggests that expropriation risk is a fundamental factor for public
flows, affecting the public foreign savings mainly through reserve accumulation.
An increase of one standard deviation in the measure of expropriation risk, the
13These regressions use the original data, available from their publisher, except for the investment
profile variable from ICRG. For a description on these variables, data, and countries included in
the sample, refer to Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013).
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investment profile subcomponent of the ICRG political risk index increases net for-
eign assets in 20 pp of GDP. In other words, an increase in the investment profile
subcomponent, which corresponds to a lower expropriation risk, implies a greater
accumulation of public net foreign assets of 20 pp of GDP.
Columns 9 to 12 show the results adding an interaction between the produc-
tivity catch-up and expropriation risk, which is significant at the 10 percent level,
while the result is only significant at levels of 5 percent through foreign reserves.
This indicates that lower expropriation risk by the government magnifies the effect
of higher productivity catch-up in the accumulation of public net foreign assets.
The next section describes the model I use to account for the expropriation
risk effects on net foreign public savings, under sudden stops and default risk.
1.4 Model
I consider an infinite-horizon small open economy, where time is discrete and
indexed by t, populated by a continuum of mass 1 of households and by a large
number of firms. The firms are owned by the households. Some produce tradable
goods, and the rest, nontradable consumption goods. The government is run by
one of several political parties, which is elected at the beginning of each period
t. A political-economy friction leads political parties to value consumption more
as an incumbent rather than as opposition, generating less-than-optimal policies.
The government is the only agent engaged in borrowing/saving in the international

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































its debt or default on it. The following subsections provide further detail on each
aspect of the model.
1.4.1 Political Environment
The political environment of this economy follows Aguiar and Amador (2011).
There is a set I = {1, 2, 3, · · · ,N + 1}, where N + 1 is the number of parties. The
government is controlled by an incumbent party, chosen at the beginning of every
period from the set I. This party may lose and come back into power eventually. The
key assumption is that the incumbent party strictly prefers consumption occurring
under its rule.
Assumption 1 (Political Economy Friction). A party enjoys a utility flow θ̃u (Ct)
when in power and a utility flow u (Ct) when out of power, where C is the per-capita
consumption basket by the domestic households and where θ̃ > 1.
There are several possible interpretations for the parameter θ̃. In principle,
this parameter captures difference in intertemporal comparisons between the party
in office and the opposition. One interpretation is disagreement regarding govern-
ment expenditures. Another one is corruption where the ruling party captures a
disproportionate share of consumption per-capita.
The transfer of power is modeled as an exogenous Markov process. Denote
p as the probability that the party in office retains power. If the party in office
loses, each party in the opposition has an equal probability of gaining power. De-
note q as the probability of regaining power, i.e. q ≡ (1− p) /N . In particular,
17
(p− q) ∈ [−N−1, 1] represents the incumbent advantage on elections. Denote pt,s as
the probability in period t that the incumbent will be in office in period s > t. A
Markov political process can be represented as:
pt,s+1 = p× pt,s + q × (1− pt,s) (1.3)
Starting from pt,t = 1, this equation has the following solution:
pt,s = p+ (1− p) (p− q)s−t (1.4)
where p = lims→∞ pt,s is the unconditional probability of taking office. For p < 1,
p = (N + 1)−1, while for p = 1, p = 1.
As a consequence of the political process and the political-economy friction,











For ease of analysis, let us define the following ratios:
θ ≡ θ̃
pθ̃ + (1− p)
(1.6)
δ ≡ p− q = p− p
1− p
(1.7)
The parameter θ is the ratio of the conditional valuation of consumption flow during
incumbency over the unconditional valuation when in the opposition. The param-
18
eter δ will represent the incumbency advantage, and can also be interpreted as the
persistence of θ in the planning horizon of the incumbent. Using these new param-
eters, Equation (1.5) can be rescaled using equations (1.6) and (1.7), yielding the















The differences between the incumbent’s and the opposition’s preferences stem
from the discounting processes. The intertemporal discount factor varies over pe-
riods, which is different from the case of a constant discount rate β. Between t
and t + 1 the discount factor is β (θδ + 1− δ) /θ and between t + 1 and t + 2 it’s
β (θδ2 + 1− δ2) / (θδ + 1− δ). Only as t→∞ does the intertemporal discount rate
converge to β. This is a feature of quasi-hyperbolic discounting à la Laibson (1997),
and the comparison is exact when δ = 0 and p = q = (1 +N)−1 (no incumbency
advantage), in which case preferences are given by:







where the discount factor between period t and t+1 is β/θ, and afterwards β > β/θ.
The parameter δ > 0 makes the differences in discount rates persist over time, given
θ̃ > 1. Notice as well that autocratic governments, where δ = 1, will yield the same
results as the case where θ = 1, so any differences in consumption/saving behavior
of their economies will come from the degree of impatience they exhibit, represented
19
by parameter β.
The following sections will describe the production and household sectors of
the economy, and then will add further details to the public sector settings.
1.4.2 Households
The representative household derives utility from consumption Ct and supplies










In this expression, Et is the expectation operation conditional on information avail-
able at time t, β < 1 is the subjective discount factor, σ > 0 is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion and Ct denotes a consumption basket. This consumption bas-
ket is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) combination of tradable CTt and
nontradable CNt goods. The parameters are a, which is the share of income destined
to buy tradable goods, and ζ, which is the inverse of one minus the elasticity of























t + Tt (1.12)
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The budget constraint is expressed in units of the tradable good. The left-hand side
represents the household’s expenditure, where PNt represents the relative price of the




t is the household’s
consumption expenditure expressed in units of the tradable good. The right-hand
side represents the income of the household. Wt denotes the household’s labor
income. ΠTt and Π
N
t are the dividends the households receives from firms operating
in the tradable and in the nontradable sector, respectively. Tt represents the net
tax/transfers to/from the government after its net asset decisions are made. For
simplicity, domestic households do not trade directly with any foreign investors.
Each period the representative household chooses CTt and C
N
t to maximize expected









where PNt will be considered as a proxy for the real exchange rate. The consumer-
price index is given then by
Pt =
[





which is the composite price-index of the consumption basket Ct.
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1.4.3 Firms in the tradable sector
Firms in the tradable sector produce the final tradable good Y Tt using labor
LTt and imported intermediate goods Mt. The production function is Cobb-Douglas
with labor share α, a labor-augmenting productivity factor Γt, and a temporary
technology shock zt.




The labor-augmenting productivity factor Γt is the knowledge used to produce the
tradable good, which is public and non-rival, and the transitory technology shock
zt has its logarithm autocorrelated of first order with persistence ρ and white noise
innovations εt, whose mean is 0 and its standard deviation, σε.
log zt = (1− ρ) log µz + ρ log zt−1 + εt, Eεt = 0, Eε2t = σ2ε (1.16)
A constant fraction φ of the purchases of imported intermediate goods must be fi-
nanced with foreign intra-period loans every period, up to a stochastic borrowing
limit κt. In addition, the government can provide public loans Dt in case the con-
straint binds, and foreign financing is not sufficient to purchase the intermediate
imported inputs:
φPMt Mt ≤ κtΓt +Dt (1.17)
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This borrowing limit κt can take two values: κL and κH > κL; and follows a Marko-
vian discrete process with transition probability F(κt|κt−1). The higher value κH is
enough to ensure that the borrowing constraint is never binding, while κL makes
the borrowing constraint bind under certain states. Whenever the latter arises, the
government will provide public loans, subject to its availability of funds. The profit







M1−αt − PMt Mt −WtLTt + µt
(
φPMt Mt − κtΓt −Dt
)
(1.18)
where µt stands for the multiplier of the borrowing constraint. The first order
conditions for the tradable firms are:
ztα (Γt)









= PMt (1 + φµt) (1.20)
µt
(
φPMt Mt − κtΓt −Dt
)
= 0 (1.21)
It is important to highlight that even if the government had the resources to
step in, the multiplier µt would still be positive unless it can restore the full first-best
choice of the firm.
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1.4.4 Knowledge accumulation process
The stock of knowledge available to firms in the tradable sector evolves ac-
cording to the following process:





where υ ≥ 0 and 0 ≥ ξ ≥ 1. This formulation captures the idea that imports of
foreign capital goods represent an important transmission channel through which
discoveries made in developed economies spill over to developing countries. As
mentioned before, knowledge is assumed non-rival and non-excludable. This, along
with the large number of firms assumed in the tradable sector, implies that firms do
not internalize the impact of their actions on the evolution of the economy’s stock










where gt+1 is the growth rate of the knowledge stock.
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1.4.5 Firms in the nontradable sector
The nontradable sector represents a traditional sector that does not engage in
international trade. Its output is produced using labor according to the function:




where Γt is the growth of the stock of knowledge in the economy, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is






In addition, the labor market must clear LTt + L
N
t = 1, as must the market of
non-tradable goods CNt = Y
N
t .
1.4.6 Private Sector Equilibrium
Definition 1 (Private Sector Equilibrium). A Private Sector Equilibrium is charac-
terized by a set of allocations {CTt ,CNt ,LTt ,LNt ,Mt}∞t=0, and prices {Wt,PNt }∞t=0 such
that, taking as given government policies {Tt,Dt}∞t=0, knowledge process {Γt}∞t=0, and
stochastic processes {κt, zt}∞t=0:
(i) Households satisfy Equation (1.12) and Equation (1.13), taking as given prices,
profits from tradable firms ΠTt , profits from nontradable firms Π
N
t , and gov-
ernment lump sum net transfers Tt.
25
(ii) Firms satisfy Equation (1.19),Equation (1.20), Equation (1.21) and Equa-
tion (1.25) and satisfy labor and non-tradable goods market clearing, taking as
given prices, the knowledge process, and government policies.
For a solution of the private sector equilibrium, see Appendix A.
1.4.7 The Government Budget Constraint
The sovereign can issue one-period, non-contingent discount bonds, so con-
tingent claims markets are incomplete. Alternatively, it can buy other one-period,
non-contingent discount bonds in the foreign market, which are risk-free. The face
value of these bonds specifies the amount to be repaid/received in the next period,
Bt+1. The government borrows if Bt+1 < 0 and saves if Bt+1 > 0. The set of the
net government savings is thus B ⊂ R.
The lower bound b is usually set to be higher than −GDP T/r∗, an annuity of
tradable value added, which is the largest debt that the country could repay under
full commitment. Alternatively, the upper bound b̄ can be set lower than GDP T/r∗,





0 ∈ B. The price of these bonds is qBt which is a function qB (Bt+1, Γt, zt,κt) set by
foreign investors.
In addition, the government can provide tradable-goods producing firms with
intraperiod working capital loans Dt when they are under distress. However, when
providing these loans, the government incurs on efficiency loss, which amounts to
ψ/ (1− ψ)Dt (Gertler and Karadi, 2011). Therefore, the government budget con-
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straint is given by:






where Tt is the amount of net transfers to the households. The loans to the private
sector cannot exceed the net savings the government has at the moment, so:
Dt ∈ [0, (1− ψ)Bt]
The public loans to the private sector are thus the minimum between the amount
that tradable-goods producing firms need to finance the unconstrained imported
inputs purchases, and the total amount of resources the government can provide to












where Mut is the unconstrained level of imported inputs used by the firms in tradable
sector, φ is the fraction of imported inputs financed with short-term foreign loans,
and κ is a credit shock to the foreign borrowing limit the tradable firms face, scaled
by the technology long-term trend Γt. An additional assumption, common in the
literature (see Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Mart́ınez, 2012) is that the government
cannot borrow in the international markets during a sudden stop.14
14A sudden stop in this paper is defined as a situation where government resources are not enough
to restore first-best levels of unconstrained imported inputs. In other words, when κt = κL, the
government may have to intervene but will not have enough resources.
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1.4.8 Default
The sovereign cannot commit to repay its debt. As in Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981), when the country defaults it does not repay at date t and is excluded from
the world credit markets starting the same period. The country may re-enter into
the international capital market with an exogenous probability η, starting with a
fresh record and zero debt.
The government chooses a saving/borrowing policy and whether to default or
not, taking the private sector decisions as given, according to the following rule:







where W ct is the expected utility for the incumbent at t of not defaulting, and W
d
t is
the expected utility of defaulting; W ot is the maximum between the expected utilities
of defaulting and not defaulting. The government will default whenever W ct ≤ W dt .
These expected utilities are given by:











ηW ot,t+1 + (1− η)W dt,t+1
]
(1.30)
Notice that W ot,t+1 corresponds to the value function of the incumbent in period t+1
but from the perspective of period t. Since the government does not commit and
has näıve hyperbolic discounting (as explained in section 1.4.1), it is very likely that
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W ot,t+1 6= W ot+1,t+1. We can write down the value functions for any horizon h ≥ 0 as
follows:









θδh + 1− δh
)







θδh + 1− δh
)
u (Ct,t+h) + βEt+h
[
ηW ot,t+h+1 + (1− η)W dt,t+h+1
]
(1.33)
Hence the probability of default depends on the likelihood that W ct,t+h < W
d
t,t+h.
Denote this probability Υt,t+h ≡ Pr
[




. This probability will be used
by foreign investors to assess the value of the government portfolio.
1.4.9 Foreign investors
International creditors are risk-neutral and have complete information. They
invest in one-period sovereign bonds and in within-period private working capital
loans. Foreign lenders behave competitively and face an opportunity cost of funds
equal to r∗. Competition implies zero expected profits at equilibrium and full arbi-
trage between the sovereign debt and the world’s risk-free asset. Hence, the price of
the sovereign net international investment position is given by:
qBt =

1/(1 + r∗) if Bt+1 ≥ 0
(1−Υt+1)/(1 + r∗) if Bt+1 < 0
(1.34)
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where Υt+1 is the probability of sovereign default in the next period. This result
assumes that in sovereign default, all assets and liabilities are seized, while whenever
foreign assets are greater than foreign liabilities, the sovereign does not default, as
it can repay debt using those assets. This provides an important simplification,
although the confiscation of foreign assets seldom occurs (Wright, Forthcoming).
1.4.10 A Recursive Formulation
For a recursive formulation, we first denote s = {κ, z} as the vector of ex-
ogenous state variables, while B and Γ are the endogenous state variables. At any
given horizon h ∈ N0, the value functions for continuation W ch, default W dh , and for
the default option W oh are given below:
W ch(B, Γ, s) = max
B′
Ωhu (Ch) + βEhW oh+1(B′, Γ′, s′) (1.35)







′, s′) + (1− η)W dh+1(Γ′, s′)
]
(1.36)
W oh(B, Γ, s) = max
{





where we define Ωh ≡ δhθ + 1 − δh. For a tractable recursive representation it is
important to consider that as t goes to infinity, the discount rate between consecutive
periods, βΩh+1/Ωh, tends to β. By using the definition of limits, it is possible to find
a horizon τ such that for any h > τ , the discount rate between any two consecutive
periods is always β as in a classical sovereign default problem.
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Proposition 1. For a sufficiently small ε, θ > 1, and δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists τ such





Proof. Define τ = logδ ε − logδ [(θ − 1) (1− δ − ε)]. Hence for h > τ the intertem-
poral discount rate in subsequent periods is close enough to β.
Note that also τ is such that Wh = V for any h ≥ τ , where V is the value
function of households. Note that if δ = 0, then τ = 0, and W1 = V ; if δ = 1 and
θ ≥ 1, Wh = V , ∀h ∈ N0.
As an illustration, in fig.1.3 the discount rate βhΩh(δ, θ) is depicted for various
values of δ, given parameters β = 0.95 and θ = 1.5. Note that the discount rate for
the first period converges in h = 1 if δ = 0, to the value that a benevolent sovereign
would discount. When δ = 0.25, Ωh converges after h = 10 for ε = 10
−6, and
after h = 41 for δ = 0.75. The importance of this discount function discussion is
that it allows us to solve the problem by using backward induction. We solve for a
benevolent sovereign for h ≥ τ and then solving backwards using the corresponding
factor Ωh. Using this result, for horizons h > τ we can solve a classical sovereign-
default recursive problem:
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Figure 1.3: Quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The figure shows the one-
period discount function for different horizons, given β = 0.9, and θ =
1.5. Traditional models feature θ = 1 and δ = 0, so there are no political-
economy frictions. If θ increases to 1.5 as in this figure, the discount
rate between periods 0 and 1 is lower than the standard case, but in
the following period is the same as in a benevolent government. This
also the case under standard quasi-hyperbolic discounting à la Laibson
(1997), due to the fact that the distortions are not expected to last due
to lack of incumbency advantage, i.e. δ = 0. If incumbency advantage is
higher (recall δ ∈ [0, 1]), the difference in discounting is less abrupt than
in the case of δ = 0, but persists longer.
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V c(B, Γ, s) = max
B′
u (C) + βEV o(B′, Γ′, s′) (1.38)






ηV o(0, Γ′, s′) + (1− η)V d(Γ′, s′)
]
(1.39)
V o(B, Γ, s) = max
{
V c(B, Γ, s),V d(Γ, s)
}
(1.40)
The definitions of the default set and the probability of default are standard from
Eaton-Gersovitz models (Arellano, 2008). For a debt position B < 0, default is
optimal for the set of realizations of s for which V d(B, Γ, s) is at least as high as
V c(B, Γ, s):
D (B) =
{
s : V c(B, Γ, s) ≤ V d(B, Γ, s)
}
(1.41)
The probability of default at t+ 1 perceived as of date t, Υ(B′, Γ, s), can be induced
from the default set and the transition probability function F of productivity shocks
z and credit shocks κ, as follows:
Υ(B′, Γ, s) =
∫
D(B′)
dF (s′, s) (1.42)
The transition probability for technology shocks z is continuous G(z′, z), given by
Equation (1.16), while that for credit shocks κ is discrete, and given by H(κ′,κ):







With this probability in mind, the price function of the sovereign portfolio is calcu-
lated as:
qB (B′, Γ, s) =
1−Υ (B′, Γ, s)
1 + r∗
(1.44)
where Υ = 0 for all B′ ≥ 0.
After having solved the “terminal” problem, we proceed to iterate backwards
until we arrive to horizon h = 0. An important assumption is that foreign investors
know whether the government behaves hyperbolically or not, so they will calculate
the default rule as:
D0 (B) =
{










qB (B′, Γ, s) =
1−Υ0 (B′, Γ, s)
1 + r∗
(1.47)
which is possible, because bonds are issued at one-period maturity.
1.4.11 Detrended Form
To solve the recursive formulation numerically, it is important to remove the
productivity trend Γ, as to reduce the number of states in the economy. This is a
feasible procedure, given that the value functions are homogeneous of degree 1− σ
in Γ, and that the price function of the sovereign portfolio is homogeneous of degree
zero in Γ and B′. This derives from the utility function specification and the fact
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that the budget and borrowing constraints are homogeneous of degree one in Γ. The
detrended form is given hence by:
vc(b, s) = max
b′
u (c) + β (g′)








ηvo(0, s′) + (1− η)vd(s′)
]
(1.49)





and g′ ≡ Γ′/Γ = υ + mξ is the future growth rate of the economy, which is known
in current period, although not internalized by the private sector. It is important
to add that the constraints for the private sector equilibrium are also scalable:
cT + PNcN = zm














The resource constraint of the economy is given by equation (1.51), while the
borrowing constraint is given by (1.52).
The solution of the model is equivalent to a constrained-centralized solution
where the central planner (the sovereign) takes the growth rate of the economy g′
as given, yielding the same first order conditions of the private sector equilibrium.
Once the terminal value functions and policy rules are solved, we iterate backwards
and find the solutions for shorter horizons, starting in period h = bτc until h = 0:
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wch(b, s) = max
b′
















′) + (1− η)wdh+1(s′)
]
(1.55)
































Definition 2 (Recursive Equilibrium). A Recursive Equilibrium is characterized by
a set of value functions {woh(b, s),wch(b, s),wdh(s)}τh=0 and vo(b, s), vc(b, s), and vd(s);









, qB(b, s), a credit policy {dh(b, s)}τh=0,
d(b, s), and a transfer policy {th(b, s)}τh=0 , t(b, s), such that:
(i) Policy rules {b′h(b, s)}
τ
h=0 , b
′(b, s) and {dh(b, s)}τh=0 , d(b, s) solve the problem





, qB(b, s). That is the
government’s default and borrowing decisions are optimal given the interest
36
rates on sovereign debt.
(ii) Private consumption and factor allocations are feasible and consistent with the
equilibrium private market defined in Section 1.4.6.
(iii) The transfer policies {th(b, s)}τh=0, {dh(b, s)}
τ
h=0, t(b, s), and d(b, s) satisfy the
budget constraints of the government.
(iv) Given default regions {D(b, s)}τh=0 and D(b, s), and probabilities of default






, and qB(b′, s)
satisfy the arbitrage condition of investors in equation (1.34).
A solution to the recursive equilibrium includes solutions for sectoral factor
allocations and production during normal periods and default, and sudden stops as
well. Solutions for equilibrium wages, profits, and the price of domestic inputs follow
then from the firms’ optimality conditions and the definition of profits described
earlier.
1.6 Parametrization
The parameters chosen are shown in Table 1.2. Parameters σ, β, and r∗ have
standard RBC values of 2, 0.9 and 4 percent (annual), respectively; for consumption,
the parameters a and ζ are taken from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016), although a
has the same value as in Benigno and Fornaro (2012). A value of ζ = 0.2 corresponds
to a value of the constant elasticity of substitution of 5/6.
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For the trend process in the tradable sector, I set υ = 0.17 so as to match
the growth rate in a non-stochastic steady state to 3.4 percent, which is the average
growth of emerging and developing economies. The elasticity of growth to imported
inputs is 0.1 and is slightly lower than in Benigno and Fornaro (2012), although
allows for the benchmark economy to have 30 percent of GDP in public net foreign
assets. For the transitory process ρ = 0.96 and σε = 1.21%, and µz = 0.49 is set
so total GDP in the non-stochastic steady state is equal to 1. These parameters
were calibrated for the Chilean economy, although they are very close to those in
Mendoza and Yue (2012) for the Argentinian economy.
For the firms, the share of labor in tradable and nontradable sectors, namely α
and γ, are both set to 0.6, which is a standard value. The price of imported inputs
is normalized to 1. The share of imported inputs that is financed with imported
inputs, φ, is set to 0.7 (Mendoza and Yue, 2012), while the social loss parameter ψ
when the government provides credit, is 0.5 (Benigno and Fornaro, 2012).
The transition probabilities for the borrowing limit κ are such that the economy
enters into a bad shock every 10 years, and stays there for 2 years (Benigno and
Fornaro, 2012). The low value κL is set to 0.12, which yields a trend growth rate of
-2.5 percent during its occurrence.
If the sovereign defaults, the probability of reentry is 1/3, which means that
the economy stays an average of 3 years without accessing the international capital
markets (Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Mart́ınez, 2012). The political-economy friction
parameter θ is set to different values, ranging from 1 to 1.5, while I consider that the
incumbency advantage is 0, as in Aguiar and Amador (2011), for ease of calculation.
38
Table 1.2: Main parameters
Parameter Value Description Source/Target
σ 2 CRRA coefficient Standard values
a 0.31 Share of tradables in consumption Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016)
ζ 0.2 CES parameter Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016)
β 0.90 Intertemporal discount factor Standard values
r∗ 0.04 International interest rate (%, annual) Standard values
η 1/3 Probability of redemption Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Mart́ınez (2012)
α 0.6 Share of labor in tradable output Standard values
γ 0.6 Share of labor in nontradable output Standard values
PM 1 Price of imported inputs Benigno and Fornaro (2012)
ψ 0.5 Share of public FC loans lost Benigno and Fornaro (2012)
φ 0.7 Share of foreign-financed imported inputs Mendoza and Yue (2012)
ξ 0.1 Elasticity of knowledge to imports Benigno and Fornaro (2012)
υ 0.17 Trend growth rate of knowledge Average annual growth of 3.4%.
θ 1-1.5 Political-economy friction Aguiar and Amador (2011)
δ 0 Incumbent advantage Aguiar and Amador (2011)
κL 0.12 Low value of κ Trend growth rate of -2.5%
1.7 Computation strategy
To solve the model in de-trended recursive form, I perform value function
iteration using a discrete state-space for b and s = {z,κ}. The values for the policy
functions, such as b′(b, s), can lie outside the discrete grids. For this purpose, I
use piecewise cubic-hermite interpolation polynomials (PCHIP), which solve the
problems of using splines on monotonic functions, such as the bond-price function,
by incorporating its first derivatives.15
The discrete grid for b is constructed by setting 41 equally spaced points be-
tween the hyperbolic tangent of bmin and bmax, and then transforming back using
the inverse-hyperbolic tangent. This allows a greater number of points to be close
to b = 0. The limits are set to bmin = −0.75 and bmax = 1.5.
15For a reference, see Fritsch and Carlson (1980), which provides the algorithm used in this
chapter.
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The discrete grid for z is constructed using the Tauchen (1986) method using
15 points and an amplitude parameter equal to 3. The discrete grid of κ consists of
only 2 points, as mentioned before.
For ease of computation, I collapse for the points z ∈ Z and κ ∈ κ into s ∈ S,
where S = Z × κ and s = (z,κ). The number of points will be 30. The transition
probability of s, Pr(s′, s), is a Kronecker product of Pr(κ′,κ) and Pr(z′, z), and
allows calculations of expectations and probabilities.
The stop rule for the value function iteration follows Chatterjee and Eyigüngör
(2014), which consists of iterating on V o(b, s) and qB(b′, s) at the same time, until the
criterion of convergence falls below a tolerance of 10−6. The criterion of convergence
is the maximum between that of the value function and that of the sovereign portfolio
price.
Once the terminal recursive formulation results are obtained, then I iterate
backwards to obtain the results with political-economy frictions, following the steps
described in previous sections.
Using the initial recursive formulation policies, I proceed to simulate the values
for the variables of the system for 11,000 periods, using the last 10,000 to calculate
the moments of the model.
1.8 Results
In this section I show the results for several characterizations of the economy
under study. First, I review the mercantilist economy without political-economy fric-
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tions, and then I address the effects of political-economy frictions. Next, I review
the results for economies without mercantilism, and the effect of political economy
frictions for this group of economies. For comparisons with the data, we refer to Na-
tional Accounts data in Penn World Tables 8.1 for emerging market and developing
economies, which are the upper-middle, middle, and low income ones as classified
by the World Bank in the year 2000, to incorporate economies that now have moved
to the upper bracket of national income.
1.8.1 The mercantilist economy without political-economy frictions
In Table Table 1.3 I show the moments of the model of the economy with
mercantilism (ξ > 0) and without political economy frictions (θ = 1), which will be
our benchmark. This model yields a volatility of consumption which is greater than
that shown in the data, while the volatility of gross domestic product is even greater,
which is also the case for the trade balance. On the other hand, the volatility of net
foreign assets is lower than that of the data. In terms of cyclicity, the trade balance
is highly countercyclical compared to the data where it is mildly procyclical, while
consumption and net foreign assets are less procyclical than in the data.
Regarding average moments, this economy features a net public savings to
GDP ratio of 30.1 percent, which would be in the 95-99 percentiles in the data,
comparable to China during the 2000s. The economy of this model never defaults,
and suffers sudden stops in which its tradable firms access public credit 0.8 percent
of the time. This economy grows on average 3.6 percent a year, which is slightly
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higher than the average for an emerging market economy according to data. When
the government intervenes in the tradable sector it provides credit equivalent to 9.9
percent of tradable output.
1.8.2 The political-economy frictions
The effect of the political-economy frictions is clearly depicted in Figure 1.4.
These frictions can explain differences in reserve accumulation of up to 20 percentage
points of GDP when the political-economy friction parameter θ is 40 percent or more.
This is a vast difference in reserve accumulation, comparable to the impact of an
increase of one standard deviation in the expropriation risk measure in the data.
The effect on real GDP growth is milder, as an increase of 40 percent in the political
economy friction leads to a decrease of around 0.35 percentage points in annual
average growth, which is lower than the distribution shown in data. This result is
mostly due to the growth trend rate of knowledge coupled with a low elasticity of
imported inputs to growth, and persistent effects of lack of access to international
credit.16
The average real exchange rate is mildly appreciated in the benchmark econ-
omy compared to economies with political-economy frictions. For values of θ of 0.4
or above, the real exchange rate is depreciated by almost 1.5 percent. Public credit
to tradable firms in times of stress, which is almost 10 percent of tradable output
16For a review on these effects, refer to Gornemann (2014), which presents an endogenous growth
model with a government that is more impatient than their households and can default on its debt.
In theory, an economy with political-economy frictions is expected to show more sovereign defaults,
and hence, much lower average growth if the type of time-inconsistent preferences shown in this
paper are present.
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Tradable output 0.0997 -0.6466 ... ...
Tradable consumption 0.1297 0.9335 ... ...
Nontradable consumption 0.0511 0.8333 ... ...
Consumption 0.0768 0.8951 0.067 0.396
GDP 0.0695 1.0000 0.038 1.000
Imported inputs 0.0745 0.4286 ... ...
Wages 0.0682 0.9927 ... ...
Net foreign assets/GDP 0.1833 0.1539 0.397 0.092
Trade Balance / GDP 0.0723 -0.8025 0.227 0.027
Domestic interest rate 0.0000 0.0000 ... ...




Average statistics ( percent)
Public savings/GDP4 30.1
GDP growth5 3.6
Real exchange rate 97.3
Public credit/tradable output6 9.9
1 Series are detrended using HP filter with parameter λ = 6.25, and statistics are calculated
using the deviations from the trend.
2 Uses national accounts data from Penn World Tables 8.1, for countries classified as upper-
middle, middle and low income, according to the World Bank Organization for the year
2000.
3 Includes only those episodes where the borrowing limit is binding.
4 Compared over periods when there is full access to international capital markets.
5 Real GDP is computed deflating nominal GDP by the consumer price index of the economy.
6 Compared over episodes where the borrowing limit has a low realization.
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in the benchmark economy, falls to 7 percent at the higher levels of the political-
economy friction, which makes growth lower during periods of sudden stops. This is
due to the fact that the economy enters these episodes with lower amounts of public
savings to backstop the tradable firms.
It is important to highlight that within the mercantilist economy, further in-
creases in θ beyond 1.5 do not increase the differences from the benchmark economy,
as the cost of not saving becomes prohibitively high for a given level of the mer-
cantilist parameters υ and ξ. As this model does not engineer endogenous growth
in the traditional sense, as there is no capital accumulation, it is very likely that
the degree of mercantilism can be also affected by the degree of political-economy
frictions, an issue that remains unaddressed in this paper.
More information on the moments of economies with political-economy friction
is shown in Table 1.4. Two important features are that the volatility of macroeco-
nomic aggregates and the number of periods under sudden stops decrease with the
increase in political-economy frictions. The former can be explained by the fact that
during normal periods, the benchmark economy achieves very high growth rates, in-
creasing the volatility compared to the political-economy friction economies; the
latter is explained by the fact that demand for imported inputs increases with the
savings the government enters the period with, so the chances of having a binding
borrowing limit are higher for the benchmark economy than for the economies with
political economy frictions.
The next section will show the models with trend growth but no mercantilism,
i.e., the learning-by-trading parameter ξ = 0.
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(a) Net foreign assets / GDP (b) Real GDP growth











(c) Real exchange rate (d) Public credit / Tradable Output
Figure 1.4: The effects of political-economy frictions θ on key variables of
the mercantilist economy. Panel (a) shows the average net foreign assets
over GDP accumulated by the government during normal times. Panel
(b) shows the average real growth of GDP during all periods. Panel
(c) shows the average real exchange rate during all periods. Panel (d)
shows the public credit given to the firms in the tradable sector by the

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is important to compare the behavior of an economy where there is no mer-
cantilism present, i.e. ξ = 0, and the trend growth rate of the economy is constant.
As can be noticed in Figure 1.5, the government now has net foreign liabilities. This
is due to the fact that the economy does not perceive important costs of not hav-
ing enough savings to withstand sudden stops. For an economy without political
economy frictions, the difference in reserve accumulation between mercantilist and
non-mercantilist economies amounts to 46 percentage points of GDP.17 Addition-
ally, liabilities do not increase monotonically with the degree of political-economy
frictions. This stems from the fact that access to international capital markets is
curtailed more often than in the mercantilist economies, as shown in panel (c) of
Figure 1.5. This does not correspond to the relation in the data because PPG debt
contains also aid flows and official loans. In Alfaro, Kalemli-Özcan, and Volosovych
(2014), PPG debt with private lenders is an increasing function of growth, which
points out to the effect of access to capital markets in setting a limit to the public
borrowing abroad of the government.
The real exchange rate, shown in panel (b), also shows important differences
between mercantilist and non-mercantilist economies. The latter shows an appreci-
ated level compared to the former, which is consistent with the view that mercantilist
economies should show more depreciated exchange rates; and moreover, the relative
17A pending exercise is to vary the degree of mercantilism, by using values of ξ ∈ (0, 0.1).
This is expected to change the amount of savings the public sector amasses. The range of public
sector savings would fall in between the values shown in this paper for the mercantilist and non-
mercantilist economies.
47
appreciation is higher the higher the political-economy frictions.
It is important to notices that political-economy frictions, as shown in panel
(d), can explain large differences in sovereign risk: a reduction of 70 percent in
political-economy frictions can reduce the sovereign spread by 800 basis points.
In Table 1.5 shows more detail regarding the moments of the model for different
degrees of political-economy frictions. In contrast with the mercantilist economy,
the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates increases with higher political-economy
frictions for low levels of θ, then increases for higher levels of θ. As shown before,
there is an increase in the number of periods without access to international capital
markets, due either to sudden stops or sovereign default.
1.9 Conclusions
This paper shows the role of mercantilism and sudden stops in emerging mar-
ket economies in explaining the existence of net positive international public assets,
while political economy frictions can account for the varying degrees of asset accu-
mulation across economies with otherwise similar characteristics. An increase of 50
percent in these frictions implies a reduction of almost 20 percentage points of GDP
in net foreign public assets, in the context of economies with growth externalities,
i.e. mercantilism. On the other hand, if mercantilism is not taken into account,
sovereigns accumulate net foreign liabilities, which dampens their access to interna-
tional markets. For this reason, political-economy frictions explain differences in net
foreign positions to a lesser extent (5 percentage points of GDP), but can explain
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(a) Net foreign assets / GDP (b) Real exchange rate














(c) Lack of access to capital markets (d) Sovereign spread
Figure 1.5: The effects of political-economy frictions θ on key variables
of the non-mercantilist economy. Panel (a) shows the average net foreign
assets over GDP accumulated by the government during normal times.
Panel (b) shows the average real exchange rate during all periods. Panel
(c) shows the share of periods that the economy spends under sudden
stops and sovereign default. Panel (d) shows the average sovereign spread



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































differences in sovereign risk: a reduction of 70 percent in political-economy frictions
can reduce the sovereign spread by 800 basis points.
As far as I know, this is the first paper providing a plausible framework for a
small open economy where the government builds a positive net foreign asset posi-
tion, while stressing the important differences that political-economy frictions and
mercantilist strategies make between the net foreign-asset positions of the govern-
ments in emerging-market and developing economies. This is important to consider
in the perspective of global imbalances: the pursuit of growth externalities in trad-
able sectors and the improvement in institutional quality in emerging-market and
developing markets may exacerbate the savings-glut problem in the world economy.
Further extensions may need to be considered to improve on the explanation of
GDP growth outcomes. As mentioned before, it may be necessary to embed models
of endogenous growth, such as growth due to increased varieties of tradable goods,
and add capital accumulation. This way, growth trends will depend to a greater
extent on institutional quality, as a vast literature has shown.
On the other hand, it may be important to study the accumulation of public net
foreign asset positions under the lens of monetary and exchange rate arrangements.
Recently, small open economies such as Denmark and Switzerland have amassed
vast amounts of foreign reserves under pressure during the European Debt Crisis,
and many economists have pointed out the use of foreign reserves in order to control
exchange rate movements finally, one could explore the use of foreign reserves in
mitigating possible banking and currency crises in emerging-market and developing
economies.
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Chapter 2: Debt Overhang, Rollover Risk and Investment in the
Euro Area (co-authored with Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan and
Luc Laeven)
2.1 Introduction
Investment expenditure in Europe collapsed in the aftermath of the 2008 global
financial crisis. Figure 2.1 shows that, by 2014, corporate investment as a share of
GDP across the euro area had fallen by more than 50 percent from its peak in 2008,
with higher declines in the most crisis-affected countries. The decline of investment
in Europe has been about double that in the US over the same period, and the
decline has been more persistent, with investment as a share of GDP recovering
since 2010 in the US but not (yet) in Europe. These same patterns hold when using
net instead of gross investment (see figure 2.2).
This collapse in investment followed a boom period during which the corporate
sector borrowed heavily. Figure 2.3 shows that indebtedness of the euro area non-
financial corporations, measured as debt liabilities to GDP, increased 30 percent
during the 2000s on average, where the increase for the periphery country firms was











Figure 2.1: Evolution of gross investment: gross fixed capital accumu-
lation of non-financial corporations. Periphery includes Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Sources: Eurostat and Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
conditions, both low interest rates and lax lending standards, during the boom years
(Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014).
We investigate whether corporate debt is holding back private-sector invest-
ment in the aftermath of the crisis during a period of tightening in lending conditions.
Specifically we ask whether high levels of corporate indebtedness at the onset of the
crisis and the financing of investment using short term debt pre-crisis are important
contributing factors to the observed decline in investment in the aftermath of the











Figure 2.2: Evolution of net investment: Net-of-consumption fixed cap-
ital accumulation of non-financial corporations. Sources: Eurostat and
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
investment as debt overhang.1 Our data set allows us to distinguish between short-
term and long-term debt, and hence we can assess the influence of debt maturity on
firm investment and evaluate the role of rollover risk. Short-term debt can be prob-
lematic during crises since firms with short-term debt might experience increased
rollover risk as lenders are often unwilling to renew expiring credit lines during a
1This is a generalization compared to more specific uses of the term debt overhang in the
literature. In the finance literature, debt overhang is typically defined as high levels of debt that
are curtailing investments because the benefits from additional investment in firms financed with
risky debt accrue largely to existing debt holders rather than shareholders (Myers, 1977). This
reduced incentive to invest implies that firms with high levels of debt face an underinvestment
problem. In the macro literature, however, debt overhang is often more loosely referred to as a
situation where high levels of public debt are crowding out private investment. See for example
Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath (2009). Krugman (1988) analyzes the choice between financing
and forgiving the debt from the perspective of creditors. Bulow and Rogoff (1991) show that a











Figure 2.3: Evolution of corporate debt to gross domestic product. In-
cludes credit to non financial corporations. Sources: Organisation of
Economic Cooperation and Development and World Development Indi-
cators.
crisis when collateral values drop and lenders’ own financing conditions deteriorate
(Diamond, 1991).2 Similarly, firms with expiring debt contracts will find it more
difficult to issue new short-term bonds when interest rates rise due to heightened
sovereign risk, when banks also face liquidity problems.3
2Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2011) show that even small changes in collateral values can
lead to dramatic changes in debt capacity when firms’ short-term debt needs to be frequently rolled
over, potentially leading to a collapse in the market for short-term lending.
3Debt maturity may also affect the debt overhang by altering incentives to invest. According
to Myers (1977), short-term debt reduces the debt overhang problem because the value of shorter
debt is less sensitive to the value of the firm and thus receives a much smaller benefit from new
investment. In the extreme, if all debt matures before the investment decision, then the firm
without debt in place can make investment decisions as if an all-equity firm. Thus, according
to Myers (1977) firms with a shorter maturity of debt are expected to experience reduced debt
overhang and invest more. However Diamond and He (2014) spell out conditions under which
reducing maturity can increase debt overhang. They show that while for immediate investment,
shorter-term debt typically imposes lower overhang, for firms with future investment opportunities,
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We argue that a firm-bank matched dataset is necessary to investigate the
effects of debt overhang and rollover risk on firms’ real outcomes, since the deterio-
ration in both firms’ and banks’ balance sheets needs to be measured at the same
time. It is important that our sample is composed of small firms (small and medium
enterprises, SMEs) since these firms are informationally opaque and hence subject
to bank financing and debt overhang. These firms cannot obtain non-bank finance.
And the impact of debt on corporate investment will depend partly on the ability
of firms to substitute bank financing for other sources of financing, which only big
firms can do (Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 1994a,b; Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox,
1993). Banks need to invest time in acquiring knowledge about each SME. This
leads to relationship banking. Previous research shows that these relationships are
sticky even in developed financial markets such as the U.S. (Chodorow-Reich, 2014).
These relationships are valuable, especially for small firms for which monitoring costs
tend to be high (Bae, Kang, and Lim, 2002; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990).
Such relationship lending may be a good or a bad thing in a crisis, depending on
the nature of shocks.
Given the situation in Europe, we focus on the effect of a deterioration in bank
balance sheets from exposure to sovereign risk. Why does sovereign risk matter for
corporate debt overhang and rollover risk? There is a direct and an indirect effect,
and we measure both in our paper. In any economy, government bond yields are
an important driver of corporate bond yields and bank lending rates, either through
shorter-term debt may impose stronger debt overhang in bad times. The reason is that sharing
of less risk by shorter-term debt implies more volatile earnings and equity, and hence more debt
overhang.
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standard interest arbitrage conditions or through sovereign bonds directly serving as
a benchmark for the pricing of loans and other assets. Moreover to the extent that
banks hold sovereign bonds and firms depend on banks for their lending, sovereign
risk can affect firm investment through bank-sovereign linkages via bank lending
channel. The effect of a weakening in banking conditions from exposure to sovereign
risk on corporate investment through debt overhang and rollover risk channels is
theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, a deterioration in the balance sheets
of banks could reduce the supply of loans to firms, leading to an increase in debt
overhang and rollover risk (Peek and Rosengren, 2000). On the other hand, weak
banks may continue to lend to risky borrowers in an effort to preserve relationships,
consistent with loan evergreening (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008; Peek and
Rosengren, 2005).
We use a comprehensive firm-level data set including small private firms that
matches firm balance sheet information from the Orbis/Amadeus database with in-
formation on the firm’s main relationship bank from Kompass and information on
the holdings of sovereign bonds of each banks from Bankscope. As an alternative
source of information on the sovereign holdings of banks we use confidential data
from the European Central Bank (ECB) which has more detailed information on
sovereign exposure for a subset of banks in our sample. By linking firms to their
banks and sovereigns, and using information on each bank’s exposure to sovereign
risk, we can exploit differences in conditions across firms, sovereigns, and banks to
identify more accurately the underlying channels of the effect of corporate indebt-
edness on investment. As argued above, the advantage of including small firms is
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that a more precise estimate of debt overhang can be obtained, because small firms
make up a large fraction of economic activity in Europe4 and because debt over-
hang is likely to be more pronounced in small firms than in large firms. In addition
to the role of weak bank balance sheets, the effects of banking distress on firms’
access to financing are likely to weigh more heavily in Europe than in the United
States, because Europe consists primarily of bank-dominated economies dominated
by bank-dependent, small firms (Mayer and Vives, 1995).
The closest antecedent to our paper, which also uses a matched firm-bank level
data set from Europe, is Acharya et al. (2014). These authors match Amadeus data
to syndicated loans and estimate the effect of shocks to periphery banks (using a
periphery bank dummy) on investment of firms who borrow from these banks in the
syndicated loan market. However these authors have a firm sample composed of
much bigger firms, since smaller firms do not access syndicated loan markets, and
hence do not focus on debt overhang and rollover risk as we do. They also do not
focus on the underlying sources of shocks to periphery banks, where we explicitly
measure these shocks as exposure to periphery banks’ own sovereign debt.
We use a difference-in-difference approach to identify the effect of corporate
debt overhang on investment, assessing the differential impact on highly leveraged
firms as opposed to low leverage firms of being located in a country that experienced
sovereign stress versus being located in countries without sovereign stress. We do
the same for rollover risk and the weak bank effect, where we measure the firm
4Firms with less than 250 employees make up 70 percent of employment and value added in
Europe. See official statistics as of 2013 from Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics.
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rollover risk as the share of short term debt in total debt, and the weak bank effect
as the bank’s exposure to own country sovereign debt when the own country is a
high sovereign-risk country. We capture the differential effect from the crisis using
a simple crisis dummy starting in the year 2008 and we measure sovereign risk
using the country’s sovereign spread relative to German bonds. We measure debt
overhang, rollover risk, and bank-firm relationships prior to the crisis in order to
mitigate concerns about reverse causality.
A key challenge for identification is to account for the role of changes in un-
observed demand shocks. It might be possible that firms are decreasing investment
due to idiosyncratic negative demand or productivity shocks rather than the debt
overhang and rollover risk channels we focus on that are also linked to firms’ banks’
conditions. To control for aggregate demand and productivity shocks we use four-
digit industry-country-year fixed effects. These effects will absorb the impact of
changes in credit demand for the four-digit sector that our firms operate in, and also
country-level demand conditions including those arising from changes in sovereign
risks and general uncertainty conditions. We assume that most of the fluctuations
in aggregate demand derive from country and narrowly defined industry-specific
factors, not firm-specific factors. We are not the first to control for demand using
industry fixed effects in general (e.g., Nanda and Nicholas, 2013 and Acharya et al.,
2014) but to the best of our knowledge we are the first to allow these effects to vary
at a very granular level (four-digit) of industry classification and also across countries
and over time. While the inclusion of four-digit industry-country-year fixed effects
may not capture all firm-specific demand shocks, all we need for our identification
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approach to be valid is that any remaining ex-post variation in firm specific demand
conditions, does not vary systematically with the level of firm indebtedness or the
firm’s debt maturity ex-ante. Moreover the analysis controls for bank fixed effects
to capture the time invariant role of pre-existing bank relationships. We limit the
analysis to firms in the euro area which were subject to the same monetary policy
but experienced diverging sovereign risk and banking conditions during the crisis.
Consistent with theories of debt overhang and rollover risk, and the significance
of bank-sovereign linkages, our findings are threefold. First, high debt levels depress
investment during crisis times, consistent with debt overhang. Second, firms with
a shorter maturity of debt reduce investment more during the crisis when those
firms are located in countries with weak sovereigns, consistent with an increase
in rollover risk associated with increased sovereign risk. An increase in sovereign
risk increases default risk, raises borrowing costs and makes it more difficult to
refinance maturing debt. Third, the debt overhang and rollover effects are in large
part driven by sovereign-bank linkages. Firms whose main bank’s balance sheet
deteriorated because of large exposure to sovereign risk experience a larger effect
from debt overhang during the crisis. Moreover, rollover risk from weak banks
is more pronounced in peripheral countries, highlighting the role of sovereign-bank
linkages in affecting firm investment. In fact, for firms located in the other euro area
countries, rollover risk is lower for firms with weak banks, suggesting evergreening of
loans by weak banks in non-periphery countries. Our results imply strong economic
effects. Given a one standard deviation change in firm’s leverage, their investment
ratio during the crisis is 0.4 percentage points relative to its pre-crisis mean. A one
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standard deviation increase in rollover risk via short-term debt adds another 0.1
percentage point reduction in investment ratio. These reductions comprise almost
20 percent of the reduction in the investment ratio after the crisis. A one standard-
deviation deterioration in firm’s bank’s balance sheet due to exposure to peripheral-
country sovereign debt results in an investment ratio that 46.8 percent lower than
the pre-crisis mean in the aftermath of the crisis.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents a literature review. Sec-
tion 2.3 presents the data set used in the paper. Section 2.4 describes the identifica-
tion methodology. Section 2.5 presents our main results, extensions and robustness
tests of our main results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature
While there has been some work on debt overhang in the sovereign and banking
sectors (Becker and Ivashina, 2014b; Philippon and Schnabl, 2013) and the house-
hold sector (Melzer, 2012),5 debt overhang in the corporate sector has received less
attention, in part because of data limitations. An exception is Giroud and Mueller
(2015) who study the impact of leverage, not debt overhang, on employment in a
sample of US firms. However, that paper does not consider the role of the maturity
structure of debt and sovereign-bank linkages, and its focus is on employment, not
investment. Another paper studying real effects of firm’s financing conditions dur-
5For instance, Melzer (2012), using US microdata on household expenditures, shows that debt
overhang plays an important role in household financial decisions, as negative equity homeowners
cut back substantially on home improvements and mortgage principal payments during the recent
financial crisis.
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ing the recent crisis is Chodorow-Reich (2014), who shows that financial conditions
deteriorated markedly for firms that had pre-crisis relationships with less healthy
lenders, with adverse implications for firm employment. However the focus of his
study is on employment outcomes rather than firm investment and his work does
not explicitly consider firm leverage.
Our paper relates to a large literature on the role of financial factors in in-
vestment decisions. At the macro level, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) were the first
to show theoretically that financial frictions, such as those arising from borrowing
constraints, have a bearing on corporate investment. Lamont (1995) is one of the
first to incorporate corporate debt overhang in a macroeconomic model. His model
shows that the effect of debt overhang varies with economic conditions. When the
economy is booming, debt overhang will not bind because investment returns are
high. If the economy is in a downturn, however, debt overhang will bind because
investment returns are low. Debt overhang thus creates a threshold value for in-
vestment returns below which the firm cannot attract funds and invest. As a result,
high levels of debt can create multiple equilibria in which the profitability of invest-
ment varies with economic conditions. More recently, Occhino and Pescatori (2010)
calibrate a model with debt overhang. They show that the debt overhang effect is
counter-cyclical, increasing during recessions when default risk is higher, and find
that debt overhang improves the fit of their model to data, compared to a model
where debt overhang is absent. Empirically, at the firm level, Whited (1992) shows
that adding debt-capacity variables to a standard investment model improves the
model fit, suggesting that financial factors do play an important role in the firms’
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investment decisions. Similarly, Bond and Meghir (1994) finds an empirical role for
debt in standard investment models. More specifically, a number of papers have
documented the significance of debt overhang on corporate investment by listed
firms from the US. For example, Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) document a neg-
ative relationship between debt and investment for firms without valuable growth
opportunities. Hennessy (2004) shows that debt overhang distorts the level and
composition of investment, with a severe problem of underinvestment for long-lived
assets. A significant debt-overhang effect is found, regardless of firms’ ability to
issue additional secured debt. Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2007) corroborate large
debt-overhang effects of long-term debt on investment, especially for firms with high
default risk.
Closer to our paper is the literature identifying the role of credit conditions in
firm investment by using exogenous bank shocks. For instance, Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1990) shows that Japanese firms tied to banks through ownership links
fared better during the 1990s Japanese crisis. Along the same lines, Bae, Kang,
and Lim (2002) shows that the valuation of Korean firms with durable lending
relationships suffered less during the 1997-98 financial crisis. Furthermore, Kalemli-
Özcan, Kamil, and Villegas-Sánchez (2010), using data from six Latin-American
countries during 1990-2008, shows that only during banking crises –when banks get
a liquidity shock– do foreign-owned firms invest more than domestic firms, and not
during recessions or balance-of-payments crises. In this regard, Amiti and Weinstein
(2014), employing matched bank-firm loan-level data from Japan, corroborates that
banking shocks to the supply of credit have large effects on corporate investment.
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Our work also relates to recent empirical literature on sovereign-bank link-
ages. Sovereign-bank linkages can arise through different channels. One direct
channel, which is the one we focus on, arises from banks holding significant amounts
of sovereign debt. As sovereign default risk increases and sovereign ratings get
downgraded, the net worth of banks holding such sovereign debt will be negatively
affected (Baskaya and Kalemli-Özcan, 2014; Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi, 2014).
A second sovereign-to-bank linkage arises from the role of the government in (ex-
plicitly or implicitly) backstopping the financial system, through guarantees and
bank bailouts (Laeven and Valencia, 2013). Such bailouts can add significantly to
sovereign debt, increasing sovereign risk (Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl, 2014).
Weaknesses in the banking sector can reinforce these sovereign-bank linkages. First,
as banks’ profits decline, government tax revenues from the financial sector are likely
to decline, increasing sovereign risk. Second, the financial condition of banks will
most likely have a bearing on banks’ demand for sovereign bonds. For instance,
banks, being protected on the downside by limited liability, have strong incentives
to game the regulatory system that places zero-risk weights on domestic sovereign
holdings by borrowing in cheap funding currencies to increase their holdings of do-
mestic sovereign debt. Such carry-trade incentives increase as the banks approaches
distress, reinforcing the loop between weak bank and weak sovereigns (Acharya
and Steffen, 2015). Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2013) shows that banks tend to
hold large amounts of sovereign paper on their balance sheets, and that they in-
crease these exposures during crises, reinforcing bank-sovereign linkages. Using the
Turkish 1999 earthquake as an exogenous fiscal shock, Baskaya and Kalemli-Özcan
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(2014) shows that banks which had higher exposure to government debt reduced
their lending more after the earthquake, while Adelino and Ferreira (2014) finds
that as sovereign ratings are downgraded, bank ratings are negatively affected as
well, increasing banks’ funding costs and reducing their credit supply. Focusing
on Europe, Popov and Van Horen (2015), using data on syndicated loans, shows
that banks with exposure to stressed sovereign debt cut back on lending, especially
cross-border lending. Similarly, also using syndicated loans, Becker and Ivashina
(2014a) shows that the increase in holdings of sovereign bonds led to a crowding out
of corporate lending, while Acharya et al. (2014), also using syndicated loans, shows
that firms borrowing from banks in peripheral Europe decreased their investment
more.
2.3 Data and Measurement
2.3.1 Firm-Level Data
Our firm-level data comes from the Orbis database (compiled by Bureau van
Dijk Electronic Publishing, BvD). Orbis is an umbrella product that provides firm-
level data that covers around 100+ countries worldwide, developed and emerging,
since 2005. Certain country subsets of the database that cover different countries
(such as Europe) go back to 1996. This is a commercial data set, which contains
administrative data on 130 million firms worldwide. The financial and balance-
sheet information is initially collected by local Chambers of Commerce, and in turn
is relayed to BvD through some 40 different information providers including official
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business registers.
The data set has financial accounting information from detailed, harmonized
balance sheets, income statements and profit/loss accounts of financial and non-
financial firms. This data set is crucially different from other data sets that are
commonly used in the literature, such as COMPUSTAT for the United States,
Compustat Global, and Worldscope databases, since 99 percent of the companies in
Orbis are private, whereas the former data sets contain mainly information on large
listed companies. In Orbis, less than 2 percent of the firms are publicly listed (data
for which is separately marketed under the product called OSIRIS). Our sample is
mainly composed of small and medium sized enterprises with less than 250 employ-
ees. These firms account for almost 70 percent of the value added and employment
in Europe, both in the manufacturing sector and in the aggregate economy.6 Given
our paper’s focus we use the European subset of the Orbis umbrella, the database
known as Amadeus. One advantage of focusing on European countries is that com-
pany reporting is a regulatory requirement (as opposed to firms operating in the
US), and therefore firm coverage is superior.
The main financial variables used in the analysis are total assets, sales, op-
erating revenue (gross output), tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, lia-
bilities, and cash flow. We transform financial variables to real terms using the
national CPI with 2005 base and converting to dollars using the end-of-year 2005
dollar/local currency exchange rate. The data set has a detailed sector classification
6See Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics (SBS) presented according to NACE Rev. 2
classification.
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Table 2.1: Euro Area Firm Coverage
Country Firm-year Firms Share of
Output
Austria 616,324 110,348 0.75
Belgium 2,021,149 230,975 0.78
Germany 4,677,260 840,016 0.47
Finland 567,860 98,438 0.51
France 8,111,300 1,129,085 0.81
Greece 321,505 37,921 0.44
Ireland 173,858 25,924 0.40
Italy 4,920,374 753,351 0.61
Luxembourg 11,635 2,309 0.72
Netherlands 1,130,866 220,342 0.28
Portugal 1,611,023 350,533 0.93
Spain 6,165,752 968,441 0.81
Total 30,328,906 4,767,683
Notes: Share of gross output comes from Kalemli-Özcan
et al. (2015), Table 6.1, for year 2012.
(up to four-digit NACE Rev. 2 industry classification). We drop financial firms and
government-owned firms, and use all the other sectors.
Table 2.1 summarizes the coverage of our data across euro area countries. The
coverage of our firms in terms of share of output ranges from roughly 50 to over 90
percent. The exception is the Netherlands, where small companies do not have to
file their accounts.
2.3.2 Matching Firm- and Bank-Level Data
Our analysis makes use of a novel data set of bank-firm relationships in Europe.
Our database includes, for each firm, a variable called BANKER showing the name
of the firm’s main bank(s) relationship, which, following the literature, we assume
to be the main bank(s) that the firm borrows from. We obtain this information
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through the Amadeus database but the original source is Kompass. This data
has been used by Giannetti and Ongena (2012), among others, to study bank-
firm relationships. Kompass provides the bank-firm connections in 70 countries
including firm address, executive names, industry, turnover, date of incorporation
and, most importantly the firms’ primary bank relationships. Kompass collects
data using information provided by chambers of commerce and firm registries, but
also conducts phone interviews with firm representatives. Firms are also able to
voluntarily register with the Kompass directory, which is mostly sold to companies
searching for customers and suppliers. We use the 2013 vintage of the database,
Kompass as built in the Amadeus 2013 vintage and take both the primary and
secondary firm-bank relationship. We examined data from the 2015 vintage and
confirmed (as have many others in the literature) that firm-bank relationships are
sticky and do not change over short periods of time.7
We combine firm-level data from Amadeus with bank-level data from Bankscope.
Bankscope is a data set, also from BvD, containing balance sheet information for
about more than 30,000 banks spanning most countries for up to 16 years. A signif-
icant hurdle is to match bank information to firm data, since the name of the bank
is the only information available to do so, and there is no standardized procedure
to match Bankscope bank names. We make use of the programs OpenRefine and
OpenReconcile that offer several approximate-matching algorithms. We use these
programs to match the BANKER variable to the bank names in Bankscope. Our
7Giannetti and Ongena (2012) use both 2005 and 2010 vintages, confirming the same result on
sticky bank-firm relationships.
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Table 2.2: Multiple and Cross-Border Firm-Bank Relationships
(% out of total number of firms of respective sample)










Note: First column shows the share of firms in matched firms
sample that report having more than one bank relationship. Sec-
ond column reports the share of firms that report having only
domestic-banks relationships.
match rate is very high, covering 87.6% of all bank name observations. Most of the
unmatched observations correspond to small cooperative banks for which data is not
available in Bankscope.
Table 2.2, focusing on euro area countries again, describes how many of these
firm-bank relations are multiple relationships (with more than one bank) and cross-
border (with banks whose parent company is foreign). Having more than one banker
is not very common across the euro area countries with the exception of Greece.
Having a foreign bank is even less common in this sample since we do not have
Eastern European countries. In the case where multiple bank relationships are
reported, the first listed bank is the main bank. We use this information to link
each firm to its main bank.
We match firms and banks for all countries in Europe. We focus only on euro
area countries in our regressions to keep monetary policy constant across countries.
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Table 2.3: Euro Area Summary Statistics
Panel A: All Firms
Variables Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Median Max.
Net investment/Capital1 24,115,248 0.097 0.625 -0.539 -0.064 2.383
Debt/Capital 30,314,689 11.048 19.846 0.430 2.898 80.463
Long-Term Debt/Debt 30,286,998 0.230 0.320 0.000 0.037 1.000
Sales Growth2 19,025,315 0.018 0.380 -1.410 0.002 1.595
Capital (in logs.) 30,328,906 11.256 2.288 -0.089 11.299 26.841
Sovereign Spread (%)3 30,328,906 0.642 1.363 -1.193 0.203 21.003
Panel B: Matched Firms
Variables Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Median Max.
Net investment/Capital1 13,193,920 0.100 0.603 -0.539 -0.056 2.383
Debt/Capital 15,907,059 11.807 20.742 0.430 3.158 80.463
Long-Term Debt/Debt 15,891,047 0.317 0.374 0.000 0.133 1.000
Sales Growth2 9,174,596 0.010 0.326 -1.410 -0.003 1.595
Capital (in logs) 15,920,596 11.743 2.526 0.018 11.824 26.841
Sovereign Spread (%)3 15,920,596 0.551 1.730 -0.024 0.059 21.003
Sov. Holdings/Total Assets:
Banks’ Total 8,009,688 0.043 0.041 0.000 0.031 0.382
Banks’ Domestic 3,955,326 0.030 0.025 0.000 0.023 0.175
Periphery Banks’ Total4 8,009,688 0.021 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.382
Periphery Banks’ Domestic4 3,955,326 0.021 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.175
1 Increase in real capital stock over lagged real capital stock.
2 Logarithmic change of real sales.
3 Sovereign spread is the spread of the 10-year government bond at constant maturity of the country of the
firm, over the German Bund.
4 These are adjusted, being equal to 0 if the country of the banker is in the core euro area, and equal to the
actual value if the country is in the periphery.
Since our firm-level sample is representative, we worry less about the selection issue
caused by the reporting bias in bank names by firms. Some firms report their banks
and some do not. For example, in Italy and Norway no firm reports their banker
names so the firms from these countries will be in our “all-firms sample” but not in
our “matched-firms sample”. We compare key statistics across both these samples
and observe that they are not statistically different, as shown in Table 2.3.
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2.3.3 Matching Bank-Level Data to Banks’ Sovereigns
To determine the country of origin of each bank in our sample, we need to
trace its ownership information to the ultimate owner. We set the country of origin
of each bank equal to the country of origin of the ultimate owner of the bank, even
if this entity is incorporated in a foreign country, under the assumption that it is
the strength of the parent bank and the safety net provided by the home country
of the parent bank that together determine the strength of each subsidiary rather
than that of the host country. Banks in the Bankscope database are all recorded as
domestic legal entities, including the subsidiaries of foreign parent companies. We
therefore need to take an extra step to identify the ultimate sovereign country of
each bank, i.e., the sovereign country of the entity that is the ultimate owner of the
bank. We trace this information using the Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) variable.
Then, we use the ultimate owner’s consolidated balance sheet, reported directly in
Bankscope. This is important to capture the internal capital markets of the bank.
Whenever the GUO information is missing, a couple of criteria are used. First,
some of the banks listed are actually branches of foreign banks. These are matched
by hand to their GUO abroad. Second, some banks are reported to be independent
or ”single location” (i.e., they have only one branch). For these banks, the GUO is
the bank itself. And finally, using the independence indicator provided by BvD, for
banks with a high degree of independence (i.e., values B-, B or B+), the GUO will
be also the bank itself, as in the previous case.
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2.3.4 Data Cleaning
In terms of cleaning the matched data set, we drop central banks and govern-
mental credit institutions, which represent less than 2% of all firm-banker relations.
On the firm side, we work only with unconsolidated accounts. We clean the data in
four steps, as explained in greater detail in Appendix B.1. First, we clean the data
of basic reporting mistakes. Second, we verify the internal consistency of balance
sheet information. The first two steps are implemented at the level of each coun-
try. Third, we do a more specific quality control on variables of interest for firms.
Finally, we winsorize the variables at least at 1 and 99 percentiles.
2.3.5 Construction of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Investment in real capital can be measured on a gross or net basis (i.e., with
or without depreciation). If investment expenditures just match the depreciation
of capital equipment, then gross investment is positive, but net investment is zero
and the capital stock remains unchanged. Therefore, net investment matters most
regarding future productivity. Consequently, we use the net investment rate in
our empirical work, computed as the annual change in fixed tangible assets.8 An
additional advantage of using net investment is that we retain observations that
otherwise would be lost due to missing data on depreciation.9 As the dependent
variable in our empirical work, we use the investment rate, computed as the ratio
8Using net investment is common in the literature; see for example Lang, Ofek, and Stulz
(1996).
9Despite the resulting loss of such observations, results are robust to using gross investment
instead of net investment.
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of investment to the one-period lagged capital stock.
We measure debt overhang using the ratio of total debt to fixed capital as
a proxy for firm indebtedness, as in Bond and Meghir (1994). Fixed capital is
measured as the firm’s gross capital stock minus depreciation, and total debt is
measured as the sum of long-term debt, loans, credit, and other current liabilities.10
Figure 2.4 plots this debt to capital ratio aggregated from our firm level data
and shows a similar increase prior to the crisis as the debt to GDP ratio that we
plotted earlier. We normalize this series to 1 in 2000 to observe the percent change
over time clearly. The difference in the debt-to-capital ratio relative to the debt
to GDP ratio is that euro area firms had a bigger increase in this ratio compared
to periphery country firms, while the debt to GDP ratio rose more in periphery
countries.
To capture rollover risk we use the share of long-term debt in total debt, which
in the tables we refer to as“Maturity”. Long-term debt comprises all borrowing from
credit institutions (loans and credits) and bonds whose residual maturities are longer
than one year. Short-term debt comprises all current liabilities, i.e. loans, trade
credits and other current liabilities with residual maturities shorter than one 1 year.
An increase in short-term debt (i.e., a decrease in Maturity) poses increased rollover
risk during bad times. Moreover, small firms finance investment predominantly
with short-term debt, and hence there is an inherent negative correlation between
the long-term debt share in total debt and investment during regular times. It is
10We use the level of debt rather than debt service, i.e. interest paid on debt, because debt-
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of total debt to capital. Average from firm-level
data. Source: Own elaboration on Amadeus database.
therefore important to also control for firm size to assess the independent effect of
debt maturity on firm investment. We thus use log of capital to control for firm size,
labeled as “Size.”
Figure 2.5 demonstrates the importance of studying small firms when focusing
on the maturity structure of debt. Most of the total debt in the euro area is held by
large firms but small firms hold a large fraction, 41 percent of the short term debt
on average.
We control for sales growth as a proxy for growth opportunities. We do not
separately control for cash flow given the fact that we already have better mea-















Large firms SME firms
Figure 2.5: Debt by maturity and firm size. Aggregated from firm-level
data. SMEs are firms with less than 250 employees and/or firms with
total assets less than 43 million euros at 2005 prices.
correlation between cash flow and sales growth.11
We measure sovereign risk based on the country of the firm’s location. Hence,
we use the sovereign spread between the firm’s country’s long-term government bond
and German Bunds. In alternative specifications we also use a periphery dummy
variable taking a value of one if the firm is located in a peripheral country.
We measure bank weakness of the firm’s main bank using the share of total
sovereign holdings of the bank over total assets of the bank. Total sovereign holdings
come from Bankscope without indicating the nationality of the sovereign. Hence,
11See Gomes (2001) for a critique of using cash flow to measure financial constraints when used
along with other growth measures such as sales growth and/or Tobin’s Q.
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we also measure the bank’s holdings of own sovereign debt using the proprietary
database IBSI on domestic sovereign bond holdings from the European Central
Bank (ECB). The difference between the two variables is that the Bankscope-based
variable captures total bonds while the IBSI-based variable captures domestic bonds
only. In practice, the difference between the two variables should be small, since most
of a bank’s total sovereign bond holdings are domestic bonds. Indeed, according to
the IBSI data for our sample of banks, around 70% of euro area banks’ sovereign
bond holdings are domestic, with an even higher percentage in peripheral countries.
We use both Bankscope and ECB data since ECB data starts later in the last
quarter of 2007 and covers fewer banks. We use these data as it is and also by an
adjustment such that if the bank is not in a periphery country we set the sovereign
holdings to zero in both datasets.
We also explored alternative measures of bank weakness based on bank lever-
age and the total capital ratio. However given that most bank assets and liabilities
are not marked to market, these balance sheet variables do not register large enough
movements to qualify as reliable measures of bank weakness. Moreover, the sovereign
bond holdings are a more direct measure of exposure to sovereign risk of each bank,
and therefore more directly capture bank-sovereign linkages.
All firm-level variables are winsorized such that kurtosis falls below a threshold
of 10. Net investment to lagged capital, the debt to capital ratio, sales growth and
the logarithm of capital stock are winsorized at the 5%, 6%, 2%, and 1% levels
respectively.
Table 2.3 shows descriptive statistics for all variables for all firms in Panel
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A. In general, there is a good deal of variation that allows the identification of the
econometric effects of interest. For instance, while the average net investment ratio is
9.7 percent, it varies widely with a standard deviation of 62.5 percent and a minimum
value of -53.9 percent. Firms’ debt-to-capital ratio also varies widely, with a large
fraction of firms holding close to zero or no long-term debt and with short-term debt
on average being much larger than long-term debt. Sovereign-risk variation comes
from the later part of the sample when sovereign-debt crisis intensifies.
Panel B of Table 2.3 reports descriptive statistics for the matched firm-bank
sample. As argued above, there are no systematic differences between the all-
firms and matched firms samples, easing concerns about selection on firms reporting
banks’ names. Bank’s holdings of sovereign bonds as a share of total assets vary
markedly from a low of zero to a high of 38.2 percent, averaging about 4.3 percent.
Banks’ own sovereign’s holdings show similar statistics.
2.4 Identification
To identify the effects of debt overhang and rollover risk on firm investment,
we use a difference-in-difference investment specification, saturating regressions fully
with country-sector-year, bank, and firm fixed effects. These absorb the direct im-
pact on investment of changing country (including sovereign) and sector conditions,
and aggregate demand. As a result we can focus on heterogenous effects of pre-crisis
debt accumulation. Specifically, firm and bank fixed effects control for unobserved,
time-invariant heterogeneity across firms and banks, while four-digit-level industry-
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country-year fixed effects absorb time-varying demand conditions, since most of
aggregate demand fluctuations derive from country- and industry-specific factors.
We first run the following difference-in-difference regression of investment on
debt, starting without interactions and then interacting all variables with the vari-
able Postt. This is a binary variable equal to 1 starting in the year 2008, which
we take as the beginning of the global financial crisis.12 For most countries in our







= β Debtisc,t−1 × Postt + λ Debtisc,t−1 + (2.1)
+ δ Maturityisc,t−1 × Postt + κ Maturityisc,t−1 +
+ Postt ×Xisc,t−1 ′ζ + Xisc,t−1 ′γ + αi + αcst + εisct
where αi is a firm-specific fixed effect and αcst is a country-sector-year fixed effect.
The vector Xisc,t−1 contains the control variables, including sales growth, measured
as the change in the logarithm of sales, and firm size, measured as logarithm of
the capital stock. The ratio of total debt to capital measures firm indebtedness
(Debt) and ratio of long-term debt to total debt measures the maturity structure
(Maturity).
We then allow the crisis effect to differ between peripheral and core countries
by including an interaction term between POSTt and PERIPHERYc which is a
12Changing the POST variable to take on a value of 1 for the years 2010 onwards and zero
otherwise does not materially affect our results. Our results are also robust to excluding Greece,
which experienced the sharpest increase in sovereign risk of all countries in the sample.
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= β Debtisc,t−1 × Postt × Peripheryc (2.2)
+ η Debtisc,t−1 × Postt + θ Debtisc,t−1 × Peripheryc
+ λ Debtisc,t−1 + µ Maturityisc,t−1 × Postt × Peripheryc
+ δ Maturityisc,t−1 × Postt + ν Maturityisc,t−1 × Peripheryc
+ κ Maturityisc,t−1 + Postt × Peripheryc ×Xics,t−1 × ξ
+ Postt ×Xics,t−1 × ζ + Peripheryc ×Xics,t−1 × π
+ αi + αb + αcst + εisct
Subsequently we replace the variable Peripheryc with weak-bank (or weak-
sovereign) variables as shown in the following equation. We add lender (bank) fixed







= β Debtisc,t−1 × Postt ×Weak Bankt−1 (2.3)
+ η Debtisc,t−1 × Postt + θ Debtisc,t−1 ×Weak Bankt−1
+ λ Debtisc,t−1 + µ Maturityisc,t−1 × Postt ×Weak Bankt−1
+ δ Maturityisc,t−1 × Postt + ν Maturityisc,t−1 ×Weak Bankt−1
+ κ Maturityisc,t−1 + Postt ×Weak Bankt−1 ×Xics,t−1 × ξ
+ Postt ×Xics,t−1 × ζ +Weak Bankt−1 ×Xics,t−1 × π
+ Weak Bankt−1 + αi + αb + αcst + εisct
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In the following section we will describe the results obtained from the econo-
metric regressions shown before.
2.5 Regression Results
Table 2.4 shows our benchmark results. The first three columns correspond
to the unbalanced panel sample of all firms (matched and unmatched) starting
on 1999 and for alternative time periods. The next three columns correspond to
the continuous firms sample for the same time periods. In this continuous-firms
sample, we do not allow entry and exit so as to follow the same firms throughout
the period. All regressions include sector-country-year effects at the four-digit sector
classification level. As shown in all columns, debt is positively associated with
investment, suggesting that much of investment is financed with debt. On the other
hand, investment is negatively associated with the average maturity of debt, meaning
investment is mainly financed by short-term debt accumulation. These findings hold
across both samples and during all time periods.
The control variables such as firm size and productivity enter with the ex-
pected signs. Sales growth enters positively, signifying the positive effect of growth
opportunities on firm investment. Firm size enters negatively, capturing decreasing
returns to scale.
Table 2.5 shows results from estimating equation (2.1), which allows for dif-
ferential effects of all variables during the crisis period 2008–2012, which we capture


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tion, which include firms as well as country-sector-year fixed effects. The results
show that during the marginal effect of debt on investment turns negative during
the crisis period. This depicts a situation of debt overhang where high levels of
debt are depressing investment during the crisis. Furthermore, having short term
debt becomes a drag on investment during the crisis, pointing to rollover risk. Sales
growth has a more positive effect on investment during the crisis as does firm size,
suggesting that bigger firms are less financially constrained during the crisis.
Our results are economically significant. According to the estimates in column
(1) of Table 2.5, during regular times, a one standard-deviation increase in the debt
to capital ratio increases investment by 6 percentage points, whereas the partial
effect of a similar increase during crisis times decreases this effect on investment
by 0.4 percentage points, yielding a total effect of 5.6 percentage points increase
in investment. A one standard deviation increase in the maturity decreases invest-
ment by 2.3 percentage points during regular times and but increases this effect on
investment by 0.1 percentage points during crisis times due to heightened rollover
risk via short-term debt. Then total effect of this variable is a 2.2 percentage points
decrease in investment. These are large effects relative to the pre-crisis mean in-
vestment ratio of 11.5% during our sample period for the euro area. It generates an
almost 20 percent of decline in the investment ratio relative to its pre-crisis mean.
Table 2.5 also shows the importance of controlling for demand shocks via the
use of four digit sector-country-year fixed effects. Column (1) relative to other
columns shows that there will be an omitted variable bias if these fixed effects
are not controlled for. Since omitted demand shocks are positively correlated with
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Table 2.5: Role of Aggregate Demand Shocks
Dependent variable: Net investmentt/ Capitalt−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Firms All Firms All Firms All Firms
Postt×Debtt−1 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Postt×Maturityt−1 0.0037** -0.0007 -0.0035** -0.0211***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Postt×Salest−1 0.0226*** 0.0229*** 0.0237*** 0.0242***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Postt×Sizet−1 0.0195*** 0.0198*** 0.0195*** 0.0193***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Debtt−1 0.0030*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0032***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Maturityt−1 -0.0721*** -0.0695*** -0.0685*** -0.0607***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Salest−1 0.0465*** 0.0472*** 0.0475*** 0.0487***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Sizet−1 -0.3444*** -0.3429*** -0.3419*** -0.3398***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Obs. 14,653,425 14,662,551 14,663,232 14,663,299
R2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
F-Test: Debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Maturity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Sales Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
4d-Sector-Country-Year FE Yes No No No
2d-Sector-Country-Year FE No Yes No No
1d-Sector-Country-Year FE No No Yes No
Country-Year FE No No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors at the firm level. Columns have differing
number of observations due to removal of singletons whose number varies across specifica-
tions. Post is a dummy variable equal 1 for t ≥ 2008. Debt is total debt scaled by total
capital. Maturity is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. Sales is the change in the
logarithm of sales. Size is measured by total capital.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
investment and negatively correlated with the maturity variable, because firms that
financed themselves more with long-term debt are exposed to lower demand during
the crisis, not controlling for demand shocks leads to a wrong signed coefficient on
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the maturity variable during crisis given the negative bias.
Table 2.6 shows that the debt overhang and rollover risk results are driven
by firms in the peripheral countries. The coefficient on Periphery × Post × Debt
is negative and significant and the coefficient on Periphery × Post × Maturity is
positive and significant. The coefficient on the triple interaction of Periphery ×
Post × Debt implies a 45 percent lower investment for a one standard deviation
increase in debt for firms from peripheral countries during the crisis, relative to the
pre-crisis mean of investment ratio. The coefficient on Post × Debt is positive and
the coefficient on Post × Maturity is negative, showing that debt overhang and
rollover risk did not limit investment as much during the crisis for firms outside the
periphery.
Column (3) of this table runs the same regression in the matched firm-bank
sample using bank fixed effects and hence shows that the results for periphery coun-
try firms continue to hold even when we condition on time invariant bank fixed
effects. Notice that the number of observations are higher when we include bank
fixed effects since now we use a data set that is at the firm-bank-time level rather
than the firm-time level. Size still has a positive role in this matched sample with
banker fixed effects but sales has no more role.
Next, we want to understand what drives these changes from regular to crisis
times, and between periphery and core countries. In other words, we want to un-
derstand what is the key shock underlying the crisis. Therefore, we investigate the
role of weak sovereigns and weak banks as potential drivers of these changes in the
effects of debt overhang and rollover risk.
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Table 2.6: Periphery and Crisis Results
Dependent variable: Net investmentt/Capitalt−1
(1) (2) (3)
All Firms Matched Matched
Periphery×Postt×Debtt−1 -0.0015*** -0.0023*** -0.0028***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Periphery×Postt×Maturityt−1 0.0181*** 0.0140** 0.0243***
(0.0034) (0.0056) (0.0051)
Periphery×Postt×Salest−1 -0.0275*** -0.0178*** -0.0070*
(0.0022) (0.0039) (0.0040)
Periphery×Postt×Sizet−1 0.0081*** 0.0103*** 0.0131***
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Periphery×Debtt−1 -0.0007*** 0.0001 0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Periphery×Maturityt−1 -0.0284*** -0.0585*** -0.0755***
(0.0031) (0.0052) (0.0048)
Periphery×Salest−1 -0.0149*** -0.0196*** -0.0158***
(0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0031)
Periphery×Sizet−1 0.0214*** 0.0469*** 0.0630***
(0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0020)
Postt×Debtt−1 0.0006*** 0.0009*** 0.0012***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Postt×Maturityt−1 -0.0071*** -0.0069* -0.0141***
(0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0039)
Postt×Salest−1 0.0418*** 0.0371*** 0.0307***
(0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0034)
Postt×Sizet−1 0.0151*** 0.0075*** 0.0043***
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Debtt−1 0.0033*** 0.0030*** 0.0028***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Maturityt−1 -0.0559*** -0.0344*** -0.0212***
(0.0021) (0.0037) (0.0036)
Salest−1 0.0564*** 0.0550*** 0.0511***
(0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0027)
Sizet−1 -0.3565*** -0.3441*** -0.3529***
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0016)
Obs. 14,653,425 5,049,070 6,415,367
R2 0.34 0.34 0.36
F-Test: Debt 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Maturity 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Sales Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Size 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Banker FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors at the firm level. Post is a dummy variable equal
1 for ≥ 2008. Periphery is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in a country of Peripheral
euro area. Weak Sovereign is the spread between the 10-year constant maturity sovereign bond
minus that of German Bund. Debt is total debt scaled by total capital. Maturity is the ratio of
long-term debt to total debt. Sales is the change in logarithm of sales. Size is measured by total
capital. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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2.5.1 Role of Weak Sovereigns and Weak Banks
We ask whether the decline in investment is due to debt overhang and rollover
risk during the crisis is due to weak banks (a firm-bank-specific credit supply shock),
weak sovereigns, or both.
Table 2.7 shows that debt overhang is stronger during the crisis if the firm is
associated with a weak bank. This table also shows a very strong direct supply effect
of weak banks (lending channel), as a result of higher exposure to sovereign debt, as
this variable has a strong negative coefficient. We measure the weak bank as total
sovereign holdings of periphery banks as a share of bank assets. The coefficients
imply an investment ratio that is 46.8 percent lower than its pre-crisis mean. Notice
that the effect is even bigger in the continuous sample of firms as shown in column (2)
since now entry of strong firms is not allowed and also exit of weak firms. However,
it seems to be the case that rollover risk does not get worse if the firm is borrowing
from a weak bank.
Table 2.8 presents results using the own sovereign bond-holdings instead of the
total sovereign bond-holdings as the proxy for weak banks. This table shows also
a very strong direct supply effect of weak banks on investment (lending channel),
as a result of higher exposure to their own sovereign debt, where this variable has
a coefficient of similar magnitude as in Table 2.7. Again, it seems that rollover
risk does not get worse if the firm is borrowing from a weak bank. Due to the
time limitation (this sample starts in 2007), POST variable is equal to 1 starting in
2009, but nonetheless results on POST interactions and direct effects show similar
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magnitudes and significance on coefficients as Table 2.7.
Overall, the results highlight the importance of sovereign risk in intensifying
the debt overhang effect, which operates in part through a deterioration in banks’
balance sheets from exposure to sovereign bonds.
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Table 2.7: Role of Weak Banks (Periphery Sovereign Holdings)
Dependent variable: Net investmentt/Capitalt−1
(1) (2)
All Firms Continuous
Periphery Sov. Holdingst−1×Postt×Debtt−1 -0.0225*** -0.0326***
(0.0020) (0.0030)
Periphery Sov. Holdingst−1×Postt×Maturityt−1 -0.1565** -0.3970***
(0.0786) (0.1021)
Periphery Sov. Holdingst−1×Postt×Salest−1 0.0278 0.0954
(0.0599) (0.0878)
Periphery Sov. Holdingst−1×Postt×Sizet−1 0.1145*** 0.1156***
(0.0132) (0.0171)
Periphery Sov. Holdingst−1×Debtt−1 -0.0078*** -0.0121***
(0.0018) (0.0027)
Periphery Sov. Holdingst−1×Maturityt−1 -0.3085*** -0.3270***
(0.0713) (0.0929)
Periphery Sov. Holdingst−1×Salest−1 0.0273 0.0039
(0.0514) (0.0765)


















Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors at the firm-banker level. Post is a dummy variable
equal 1 for t ≥ 2008. Periphery Sov. Holdings is the share of total sovereign bond-holdings of total
assets in peripheral euro area banks (0 for core euro area banks). Debt is total debt scaled by total
capital. Maturity is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. Sales is the change in the logarithm
of sales. Size is measured by the logarithm of total capital. Uses 4-digit level sector classification.




Periphery Sov. Holdingst−1×Postt -1.1388*** -1.0704***
(0.1827) (0.2431)




F-Test: Debt 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Maturity 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Sales Growth 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Size 0.00 0.00
Firm FE Yes Yes
Sector-Country-Year FE Yes Yes
Banker FE Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors at the firm-banker level. Post is a dummy variable
equal 1 for t ≥ 2008. Periphery Sov. Holdings is the share of total sovereign bond-holdings of total
assets in peripheral euro area banks (0 for core euro area banks). Debt is total debt scaled by total
capital. Maturity is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. Sales is the change in the logarithm
of sales. Size is measured by the logarithm of total capital. Uses 4-digit level sector classification.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.5.2 Threats to Identification
One worry is the possibility that firms with high and low debt were already on
different investment paths before the crisis, and hence the heterogenous investment
effects we find for high and low debt firms are not due to the crisis. To check for
this possibility, we plot in Figure 2.6 investment dynamics for high and low debt
firms throughout our sample period and show that there is no significant difference
in investment patterns of these firms.
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Table 2.8: Role of Weak Banks (Periphery Domestic Sovereign Holdings)
Dependent variable: Net investmentt/Capitalt−1
(1) (2)
All Firms Continuous
Periphery Dom. Sov. Holdingst−1×Postt×Debtt−1 -0.0224*** -0.0247***
(0.0050) (0.0064)
Periphery Dom. Sov. Holdingst−1×Postt×Maturityt−1 0.0844 -0.1470
(0.2079) (0.2454)
Periphery Dom. Sov. Holdingst−1×Postt×Salest−1 0.1794 0.1051
(0.1901) (0.2564)
Periphery Dom. Sov. Holdingst−1×Postt×Sizet−1 0.1145*** 0.0757
(0.0405) (0.0524)
Periphery Dom. Sov. Holdingst−1×Debtt−1 -0.0061 -0.0197***
(0.0051) (0.0065)
Periphery Dom. Sov. Holdingst−1×Maturityt−1 -0.6017*** -0.7097***
(0.2106) (0.2480)
Periphery Dom. Sov. Holdingst−1×Salest−1 -0.2209 -0.1070
(0.1829) (0.2482)


















Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors at the firm-banker level. Post is a dummy variable
equal 1 for≥ 2009. Periphery domestic sovereign bond-holdings are scaled by total assets, and equal
to zero if the bank has a parent from a core euro area country. Debt is total debt scaled by total
capital. Maturity is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. Sales is the change in the logarithm




Periphery Dom. Sov. Holdingst−1×Postt -1.3576** -0.7562
(0.5604) (0.7345)




F-Test: Debt 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Maturity 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Sales Growth 0.00 0.00
F-Test: Size 0.00 0.00
Firm FE Yes Yes
Sector-Country-Year FE Yes Yes
Banker FE Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered errors at the firm-banker level. Post is a dummy variable
equal 1 for≥ 2009. Periphery domestic sovereign bond-holdings are scaled by total assets, and equal
to zero if the bank has a parent from a core euro area country. Debt is total debt scaled by total
capital. Maturity is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. Sales is the change in the logarithm
of sales. Size is measured by the logarithm of total capital. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.6 Conclusion
We analyze a comprehensive dataset of European firms – including both small
(SMEs) and large firms – to study the determinants of corporate investment prior
to and during the European sovereign debt crisis. We find evidence consistent with
debt overhang, defined as corporate indebtedness relative to capital, holding back
investment in Europe especially during the crisis. We also show that rollover risk
lowered investment during the crisis as evidenced by a negative impact of shorter
debt maturity on investment, but had a positive effect during normal times.
The heightened rollover risk during the crisis might be linked to an increase
in sovereign risk as seen in Table 2.6, which reflects both a direct effect from the
reduction in creditworthiness of the sovereign on corporate. We also find that debt
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Figure 2.6: Average Net Investment Rate by Level of Indebtedness. High
Debt firms are those whose average short-term debt between 2005-07 is
greater than the average 2005-07 median of its country.
relationship with weak banks.
We identify these results using a difference-in-difference estimation approach,
comparing investment of high debt overhang firms with low debt-overhang firms
across crisis and normal times, and absorbing demand shocks through country-
industry-year fixed effects, with industry measured at a fine four-digit level. Fur-
thermore we use confidential ECB data on the exposures of banks to (own) sovereign
debt together with information on the main bank relation of each firm to identify the
role of sovereign-bank linkages in driving the effects of debt overhang and rollover
risk. These regressions also include banker fixed effects alongside firm fixed effects
to control for sticky bank-firm relationship and also to identify from firms who have
relationships with more than one bank.
In quantitative terms, the debt overhang and rollover risk channels are impor-
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tant. Our estimated coefficients imply that, given a one standard deviation increase
in rollover risk via short-term debt, the investment ratio is almost 11.7 percent lower
relative to its pre-crisis mean. A one standard deviation deterioration in the balance
sheet of the firm’s bank due to exposure to periphery country debt, results in an
investment ratio that 46.8 percent lower than the pre-crisis mean in the aftermath
of the crisis.
These results highlight that debt overhang played a significant role in holding
back corporate investment during the European debt crisis, despite unprecedented
monetary policy measures that brought interest rates down to the zero lower bound.
Debt overhang turned into rollover risk during the crisis since most of the debt
accumulation that was used to finance investment during the boom years was short-
term debt. A key role is due to bank-sovereign linkages since firms who borrowed
from banks who had deteriorating balance sheets during crisis via their sovereign
holdings fared worse. Our findings suggest that low interest rates by themselves are
not a panacea and that other growth-enhancing policies, such as the asset purchase
program recently implemented by the European Central Bank, are needed to reduce
the corporate debt overhang and stimulate investment and the real economy.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1
In this appendix, I will provide further details in the solution of the benchmark
model, with mercantilism, sovereign default and sudden stops.
A.1 Competitive equilibrium
To solve the competitive equilibrium for the private sector, I use the detrended
first order conditions of the households and firms to obtain an equilibrium equation
as a function of labor in the tradable sector, taking as giving the net foreign asset
decisions of the government.
A.1.1 Unconstrained solution
Starting from the first order conditions of the tradable sector firms’, we can








. Using this expression, we can find an expression for







Using the first order condition of nontradable sector firms’ and that of households,
plus the resource constraint and the nontradable market clearing condition, I arrive























This equation has the possibility of having more than one root in the inter-
val [0, 1]. For this matter, the algorithm to solve the equation uses 41 Chebyshev
collocation points, and brackets the function for the highest root, as to keep the
monotonicity of the relation between tradable labor and next-period sovereign net
foreign assets.
Once a solution for labor in tradable sector is calculated, using the resource
constraint and the nontradable market clearing conditions, is straightforward to
calculate the rest of the variables.
A.1.2 Unconstrained solution under sovereign default














1+ν − w∗tLTt (A.4)
It is important to highlight that for a sovereign default, the firms are subject
to sudden stops with the same parameter κ under no sovereign default, i.e. κ = 0.12,




When the realization of borrowing limit κ is a low level, we need to check
whether φPMmut > κt, where m
u
t is the unconstrained level of imported inputs. If
the sovereign has enough resources, it could finance the gap and restore the first-best
equilibrium, or get closer to it:
mt =
κ+ max [min (φPMm
u
t − κt, (1− ψ) bt) , 0]
φPM
(A.5)
Even if the government can help achieve mut , there is a social cost for such
credits which impacts transfers to households. Hence, we need to recalculate the























In the case of sovereign default, the firms are always subject to a borrowing
limit of κ = 0.12. Since they default on debt, cannot access debt and cannot provide
credit to tradable firms, the calculation is much simpler by substituting bt = dt = 0
into the previous equation.
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Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 AMADEUS Data Cleaning
We work only with unconsolidated accounts. We clean the data in four steps.
First, we clean the data of basic reporting mistakes. Second, we verify the internal
consistency of balance sheet information. The first two steps are implemented at
the level of each country. Third, we do a more specific quality control on variables
of interest for firms. Finally, we winsorize variables.
B.1.1 Cleaning of Basic Reporting Mistakes
We implement the following steps to correct for basic reporting mistakes:
1. We drop firm-year observations that have missing information on total assets
and operating revenues and sales and employment.
2. We drop firms if total assets are negative in any year, or if employment is
negative or greater than 2 million in any year, or if sales are negative in any
year, or if tangible fixed assets are negative in any year.
3. We drop firm-year observations with missing, zero, or negative values for ma-
terials and operating revenue or sales and total assets.
4. We drop firm-year observations with missing information regarding their in-
dustry of activity.
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B.2 Internal Consistency of Balance Sheet Information
We check the internal consistency of the balance sheet data by comparing the
sum of variables belonging to some aggregate to their respective aggregate. We
construct the following ratios:
1. The sum of tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other fixed assets
as a ratio of total fixed assets.
2. The sum of stocks, debtors, and other current assets as a ratio of total current
assets.
3. The sum of fixed assets and current assets as a ratio of total assets.
4. The sum of capital and other shareholder funds as a ratio of total shareholder
funds.
5. The sum of long term debt and other non-current liabilities as a ratio of total
non-current liabilities.
6. The sum of loans, creditors, and other current liabilities as a ratio of total
current liabilities.
7. The sum of non-current liabilities, current liabilities, and shareholder funds
as a ratio of the variable that reports the sum of shareholder funds and total
liabilities.
After we construct these ratios, we estimate their distribution for each country
separately. We then exclude from the analysis extreme values by dropping observa-
tions that are below the 0.1 percentile or above the 99.9 percentile of the distribution
of ratios.
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B.3 Further Quality Checks
1. Liabilities. As opposed to listed firms, non-listed firms do not report a sepa-
rate variable ”Liabilities.” For these firms we construct liabilities as the differ-
ence between the sum of shareholder funds and liabilities (”SHFUNDLIAB”)
and shareholder funds or equity (”SHFUNDS”). We drop observations with
negative or zero values.
We could also have computed liabilities as the sum of current liabilities and
non-current liabilities. However, we find that there are more missing obser-
vations if we follow this approach. Nevertheless, for those observations with
non-missing information we compare the value of liabilities constructed as the
difference between SHFUNDLIAB and SHFUNDS and the value of liabilities
constructed as the sum of current and non-current liabilities. We look at the
ratio of the first measure relative to the second measure. Due to rounding
differences the ratio is not always exactly equal to one and so we remove only
firm-year observations for which this ratio is greater than 1.1 or lower than
0.9.
We drop firm-year observations with negative values for current liabilities,
non-current liabilities, current assets, loans, creditors, other current liabilities,
and long term debt. Finally, we drop observations for which long term debt
exceeds total liabilities.
2. Sector Classification We drop financial and government firms, by dropping
those with sector codes K and O in the 1 digit NACE Rev.2 Classification.
In addition, we drop firm-year observations in four-digit sector and years with
less than 10 observations.
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